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Apologies are interpersonal tools that individuals employ to repair damaged 
relationships. Management scholars have largely ignored the role that power and status 
play in the apology process. Across three studies I experimentally manipulate power and 
status and examine the apology process via a workplace scenario.  In Study 1 I propose 
that power and status have different implications with respect to one’s willingness to 
apologize.  I orthogonally manipulate power and status and examine their effect on 
people’s willingness to apologize.  I find that status, but not power, impacts one’s 
willingness to apologize.  In Study 2 I posit and find that apologies improve victims’ 
perceptions of power and status-holders’ warmth, with no diminution of their dominance, 
thereby enhancing their influence.  In Study 3 I demonstrate that instrumentality 
perceptions mediate the relationship between status and willingness to apologize.  I 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The phenomenon of a leader apologizing is both understudied by scholars and 
underutilized in practice.  This in spite of the fact that there is a growing body of 
scholarly work on how and why people apologize, and the associated benefits (e.g. Fehr 
& Gelfand, 2010; Leunissen, De Cremer, & Folmer, 2012; Tomlinson, Dineen, & 
Lewicki, 2004).  I contribute to this literature by considering how individuals’ status and 
power, two fundamental bases of social hierarchy, influence their willingness to 
apologize.  There is little consensus in the literature about whether power or status, as 
defined herein, makes one more or less willing to apologize.  I further consider victim 
perceptions of those with power and status who offer an apology following an offensive 
act.  
Within the power and status literatures there has been a relative lack of focus on 
the consequences of power and status on interpersonal dynamics (Blader & Chen, 2012).  
Researchers are just beginning to explore the differences between power and status, with 
initial evidence suggesting that these factors produce opposite effects (Blader, Shirako, & 
Chen, 2016).  Moreover, within the apology literature the focus has been on the apology 
itself, and not the relationship between the two parties in conflict (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 
2006; Ren & Gray, 2009).   These represent notable gaps in the apology, power, and 
status literatures that the present research seeks to fill. 
  An apology has been defined in the psychology literature as a verbal or written 
statement that acknowledges responsibility, remorse, and regret for a trust or rule 
violation (Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004).  Apologies are an effective way for 




(Kador, 2009).  We see examples of leaders apologizing for a variety of acts, from 
business executives such as Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase and former Target CEO 
Gregg Steinhafel, to politicians such as New Jersey governor Chris Christie and then 
presidential candidate Donald Trump (Ross Sorkin, 2014; Haberman, 2016).  However, 
these apologies – to the extent that they are seen as authentic - are made to improve 
public sentiment with an eye toward one’s customer base or other important stakeholders, 
for example voters (Kellerman, 2006).  Moreover, apologies by public leaders are often 
delivered on behalf of entire organizations and not the individuals in question.   
By contrast, in this dissertation I explore the apology process in an interpersonal 
context.  I consider a hypothetical situation in which an individual with power and status 
- or lack thereof - has offended another individual.  In one set of studies, I test whether 
the offender is willing to deliver a simple and sincere apology immediately following the 
offensive act.  In another study, I examine victim perceptions of the offender in the 
aftermath of the apology.  I examine these dynamics using vignettes that place 
individuals in a professional setting.  However, my focus is not on an act of task-related 
incompetence on the part of the offender, but rather on an act of interpersonal aggression.  
Moreover, the offensive act does not represent an extreme form of hostility, but 
nevertheless rises to the level at which an apology is in order.   
Some additional boundary conditions and assumptions are fundamental to my 
inquiry.  First, I do not take into account the status or power level of the victim, just that 
of the offender.  Second, I do not take into account the nature of the relationship between 
the two parties before the offensive act.  Thus, I assume that the particular aspects of this 




study of the aftermath of an apology, I assume that an apology is delivered in a simple 
and sincere manner.   
These boundary conditions and assumptions are limitations of my studies.  
However, considering apologies in this context is necessary as jobs in the modern 
workplace increasingly revolve around interpersonal interactions (Grant & Parker, 2009).  
Further, people sometimes act in interpersonally offensive ways, whether intentionally or 
not (Hershcovis & Barling, 2010). Indeed, instances of interpersonal aggression or 
incivility, such as rudeness or publicly yelling at an interaction partner, are behaviors that 
are not uncommon in the workplace (Pearson & Porath, 2009).   One reason for this is 
that individuals’ job demands and stress levels are frequently high. As a result, incidents 
of abusive or uncivil behavior by supervisors or peers at work occur, and are a significant 
problem (Andersson & Pearson, 1999; Tepper, 2007).  Workplace slights in turn often 
escalate into interpersonal conflict, which has deleterious consequences for both the 
individuals in question and organizations as a whole (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; de Wit, 
Greer, & Jehn, 2011).  Thus, it is essential for scholars and practitioners alike to 
understand how interpersonal offense can be effectively managed, if not allayed.   
Social scientists have consistently found that apologies are an effective way to 
address conflict and repair damaged relationships (Barling, Turner, Dezan, & Carroll, 
2008; Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007).  Indeed, for some types of offenses an 
apology may be the only way to improve the situation between two parties (Tavuchis, 
1991).   This is largely because apologies play a unique and often vital role in resolving 




as a tool that individuals can use to manage harmful conflict and mitigate the damage 
from offensive actions (Fehr & Gelfand, 2010).   
Nonetheless, despite the apparent benefits of issuing an apology, leaders and 
others with high power or status may be reluctant to issue apologies, particularly 
following a relational transgression (Hetrick, Cushenbery, Fairchild, Hunter, Shapiro, & 
Shah, 2014; Lazare, 2004; Tucker, Turner, Barling, Reid, & Elving, 2006).  There are 
many potential reasons for this.  For one, an apology represents an admission of guilt, and 
those with high power and/or status may not want to accept blame for an action that is not 
befitting of their hierarchical position or general social standing.  Supervisors in 
particular may feel as though an apology reveals weakness and undermines their 
authority (Basford, Offerman, & Behrend, 2014).  Indeed, the act of violating social 
norms has been shown to convey power (Van Kleef, Homan, Finkenauer, Gündemir, & 
Stamkou, 2011).   
Further, those with power and status may feel as though it is more acceptable for 
them not to apologize.  For example, political pundits highlight President Trump’s 
unwillingness to apologize as a core principle of his leadership style (Krugman, 2017; 
McGregor, 2017).  Moreover, findings suggest that apologies from high status others are 
indeed more unexpected than those from low status others, one indication of their relative 
infrequency in practice (Walfisch, Van Dijk, & Kark, 2013).   
Nonetheless, given the potential interpersonal benefits of apologizing, it is critical 
for researchers to determine whether there is something related to the nature of power 
and/or status that might be hindering those who possess it from apologizing after 




considerations are pervasive in society, and most especially within organizations (Magee 
& Galinsky, 2008).  I have chosen to study power and status as antecedents of 
willingness to apologize, rather than as moderators, because power and status have been 
shown to be predictors of social factors such as the of deliverance of organizational 
justice, and perspective-taking, among other related phenomena (Blader & Chen, 2012; 
Blader et al., 2016).   
Further, given that power and status are often jointly held, it is particularly 
important for scholars to distinguish whether these constructs have similar or divergent 
implications for the apology process.  To this end, I hypothesize and test whether high 
and low power, and high and low status, exert opposing influences on one’s willingness 
to apologize.  I utilize a control condition, representing a neutral state of power/status, in 
order to establish a baseline from which I can determine the incremental effect of high 
power, low power, high status, and low status on willingness to apologize.  That is, if I 
were to examine just the contrast between high versus low power, or high versus low 
status - i.e. not include a control condition - I might not able to hone in on whether a 
specific manipulation was increasing or diminishing willingness to apologize.    In 
addition to studying the effect of status and power on willingness to apologize, I also 
conduct a mediation analysis to delve into the underlying psychological mechanisms 
related to apology intentions.   
Turning to the aftermath of an apology, the literature is inconclusive as to the 
effectiveness of apology: that is, an apology does not universally lead to positive 
outcomes (Conlon & Ross, 1997; Lee, Peterson, & Tiedens, 2004; Struthers, Eaton, 




Indeed, a host of factors may impact how an apology is received, including for example 
how costly the victim sees the apology for the offender (Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009).  
More relevant to the current research, scholars have observed that there is a dearth of 
research examining the effectiveness of apologies when power is a factor (Walfisch, et 
al., 2013).   
Thus, we are left with many unanswered questions concerning victims’ reactions 
to apologies from power and status-holders. One of the most fundamental of these is how 
do victims of an interpersonal offense committed by those with high power or high status 
react to an apology from the offender?  I argue that it is critical to hone in on reactions to 
apologies from this group of offenders since people tend to be highly cognizant of the 
behavior of those with high power and/or high status (Fiske, 2010).  This increased 
awareness would apply to both an interpersonal offense, as well as to a subsequent 
apology, or lack thereof.  Further, in organizations the occurrence of injustice, 
aggression, and abuse from one’s supervisor and/or others with power and status is one of 
the most vexing and serious issues in the modern workplace (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 
2006; Sutton, 2007; Tepper, 2007).  As such, any intervention that might address 
interpersonal offenses is of critical importance.   
Addressing the reaction to apologies in a broader sense, scholars have examined a 
number of outcomes, most notably victim trust in, and forgiveness toward, the offender.  
While these are important outcomes for both victim and offender, it is important to 
consider outcomes that are of interest to a particular class of offenders - in this case those 
with high power and high status – so as to establish a motive for apologizing.  To this 




influence that they retain over others after committing an offensive act.  I hold that 
maintaining or enhancing one’s influence might be seen as a motive to apologize.  
Finding a motive for people to apologize is important given that individuals often find it 
difficult to apologize (Lazare, 2004), which may be related to a desire to avoid an 
admission of guilt (Robbennolt, 2003), or to preserve one’s sense of control (Okimoto, 
Wenzel, & Hedrick, 2013).  Indeed, these are particularly important factors for those with 
high power and/or status.   
I propose that an apology after an offensive act – relative to no apology - will 
enhance high power/status-holders’ level of influence.  Further, I argue that this occurs 
via perceptions of their warmth and dominance.  Perceptions of one’s warmth and 
dominance are fundamental routes to one’s level of influence (Cialdini, 1993).  
Ultimately, I argue that apologies will impact these perceptions in a positive way, and as 
a result, apologies might be seen as tools of influence, particularly when used in certain 
contexts.  Support for my argument would imply that for those in possession of high 
power or high status the act of apologizing holds significant upside, with limited 
downside, as it relates to one’s degree of influence over others.  Concurrently this is also 
expected to have a positive impact on the psychological well-being of victims, resulting 
in multiple beneficiaries of this one act. 
In sum, in this dissertation I develop and test a model of whether those with high 
and low power, and high and low status, are willing to apologize following 
interpersonally offensive acts.  I further test two mediating mechanisms related to the 




the interpersonal impact of apologies, focusing on victim reaction toward those with high 
power and high status.   
  I disentangle power from status to better isolate the influence of each construct, 
and to provide greater explanatory power in the form of different causal paths.  I draw 
from a diverse set of literatures including psychology, management, sociology, and 
communication to develop my hypotheses, and rely on experimental methods to test my 
hypotheses.   
This dissertation is organized in the following way.  In Chapters Two, Three, and 
Four, I provide a review of the relevant theory and findings in the status, power, and 
apology literatures to develop my hypotheses.  In Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, I 
describe the methods that I used to test these hypotheses, and present my results.   And in 
Chapter Eight, I offer concluding comments and specify potential limitations and future 





Chapter 2: Power, Status and the Willingness to Apologize 
I draw upon and integrate three large and distinct bodies of literature within social 
psychology and organizational behavior: the apology literature, the power literature, and 
the status literature.  First I review scholarly work relating to apologies.   This includes a 
general overview of apologies, as well as a summation of the studies linking apologies to 
the most highly studied outcomes: trust, forgiveness, and reconciliation.   Next I describe 
the relatively limited theoretical and empirical work regarding individuals’ tendencies to 
apologize.  I then provide a summary of relevant findings in the power and status 
literatures.  Finally, I lay out my argument concerning how power and status impact one’s 
willingness to apologize.   
Apology 
Overview  
The act of apologizing has long drawn the attention of social scientists, many of 
whom have theorized about the powerful restorative impact of apologies.  Goffman’s 
(1971) notion of an apology involved an admission of responsibility and regret following 
a harmful act.  Further, Goffman (1971) saw apologies as a means to metaphorically split 
an individual into two parts, one part responsible for a wrongdoing and the other part 
hoping to be forgiven.   In this way an apology enables an actor to convey that an “event 
should not be considered a fair representation of what [he/she] is really like as a person” 
(Schlenker, 1980, p.154).  The result is that the party committing the offense can be 
forgiven and the parties can return to a more “normal” course of relations (Ren & Gray, 




The sociologist Tavuchis (1991) and the psychiatrist Lazare (2004) build upon 
this notion by separately arguing that the critical components of an apology are an 
expression of remorse and an admission of responsibility.  Tavuchis (1991) further argues 
that the power of an apology lies in the fact that even though it cannot logically undo 
what has been done, that is “precisely what it manages to do” (p. 5).  Lazare (2004) 
echoes this sentiment: “One of the most profound human interactions is the offering and 
accepting of apologies” (p. 1).  A fundamental aspect of apologies is their unique ability 
to repair broken relationships. For example, psychologists Chapman and Thomas (2008) 
posit that when a relationship is tarnished by hurt and anger, an apology is always 
necessary.  Within the psychology and management literatures much of the early work on 
apologies focused on the restorative impact of apologies on victim trust, and that is where 
I begin my review. 
Apologies and Trust 
  Trust violations are interpersonal transgressions that lead to a breach of trust and 
a reduced level of trustworthiness for the offending party (Kim et al., 2004).  Empirical 
findings support the idea that apologies are effective in repairing trust in fractured 
relationships.  For example, Tomlinson, et al. (2004) explored both the structure and 
outcomes of apologies.  Most fundamentally, they showed that apologizing is superior to 
not apologizing as it relates to repairing trust in a relationship.  They also demonstrated 
that apologies are more effective when they are: (i) perceived to be sincere; (ii) timely; 
(iii) expressed in terms of “taking responsibility”; and (iv) within the context of a pre-




theorizing, particularly sincerity, which is often considered to be a fundamental part of an 
apology (Smith, 2008).   
Building on the notion that apologies are vital interpersonal tools to restore trust, 
researchers delved more deeply into the contextual factors impacting apology 
effectiveness.  For instance, one key distinction is trust violations involving a 
competence-based violation versus an integrity-based violation.  The difference between 
these two is that a competence-based violation relates to a work mistake of a technical 
nature, whereas an integrity-based violation involves a breach that offends one’s ethical 
principles (Kim et al., 2004). Addressing this difference, Kim et al. (2004) found that 
apologies effectively repaired trust following competence-based violations, but not 
following integrity-based violations.   
Kim, Dirks, Cooper, and Ferrin (2006) added further complexity to the model by 
considering the combined effect of the violation type and the attributions made during the 
apology.  More specifically, they varied the language in an apology such that the offender 
made either an internal or external attribution for the violation.  They found that after a 
competence violation, trust was more successfully repaired when a party apologized with 
an internal attribution; but after an integrity violation, trust was more successfully 
repaired when a party apologized with an external attribution.  Thus, apology 
effectiveness can be seen as contextually driven. 
A separate but related line of research has considered apologies following 
intentional versus unintentional transgressions.  Findings in this stream reveal that people 
are more willing to forgive and look favorably upon offenders who apologize after 




Further, Brooks, Dai, and Schweitzer (2014) found that even superfluous apologies – that 
is, apologies for events that are clearly outside of one’s control - increase trust in the 
apologizer.  This result is consistent with prior research in the sense that a superfluous 
apology essentially involves an external attribution, and in these instances apologies have 
been shown to be highly effective in restoring trust.   Moreover, this finding is 
theoretically consistent with the findings concerning competence versus integrity-based 
violations in one key way: both integrity and intentional transgressions lead to negative 
dispositional judgments, which are difficult for victims to overlook.    
Apologies and Forgiveness/Reconciliation 
  Apologies yield positive interpersonal outcomes beyond trust.  Most notably, 
apologies inspire forgiveness on the part of recipients towards offending parties (Fehr & 
Gelfand, 2010; Andiappan & Treviño, 2011; Struthers, et al., 2008; Bachman & 
Guerrero, 2006; Exline & Baumeister, 2000).   This is in line with the premise that an 
apology is essentially a request for forgiveness (Chapman & Thomas, 2008).  
Forgiveness is desirable as it represents the internal act of foregoing anger, resentment, 
and revenge against those who commit offensive actions (Aquino, et al., 2006).  Thus it is 
perhaps not surprising that apologies help to mitigate negative perceptions and aggressive 
behavior from parties who have been injured (De Cremer & Schouten, 2008; Obhuchi, 
Kameda, & Agarie, 1989).  
Moreover, apologies and forgiveness are seen as important, if not required, 
precursors to interpersonal reconciliation between parties.  Chapman and Thomas (2008) 
argue that without an apology - and the associated forgiveness - there can be no true 




wither.  This is consistent with findings from the trust literature which suggest that when 
broken, trust is difficult to restore (Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009).  Similarly, Tavuchis 
(1991) acknowledges a natural tension between sorrow and forgiveness that occurs 
between two parties: only when this tension is resolved via an apology can reconciliation 
occur.  Indeed, the “apology-forgiveness cycle” is theorized to be the fundamental 
process wherein reconciliation takes place between parties in conflict (Shnabel & Nadler, 
2008; Tavuchis, 1991).   In support of this thinking, Karremans and Van Lange (2008) 
found that after forgiving another party, victims were more cooperative toward their 
offenders and more willing to make personal sacrifices for them.    
Willingness to Apologize 
Considering the large and growing body of literature on the positive effect of 
apologies, it is surprising how few studies examine the willingness of the offending party 
to apologize.  Indeed, the vast majority of apology research to date has considered the 
victim’s perspective, while virtually ignoring the perspective of the offender (e.g., Eaton, 
Struthers, & Santelli, 2006; Eaton, Struthers, Shomrony, & Santelli, 2007; DeCremer, 
van Dijk, & Pillutla, 2010).  This is particularly noteworthy since it is the offending party 
that is often expected to initiate the reconciliation process (Leunissen, 2014). 
Lazare (2004) noted that in general individuals are reluctant to apologize.  
Nonetheless, he argued that people may differ in their propensity to apologize.  Building 
on this concept, Howell, Dopko, Turowski, and Buro (2011) surveyed 940 undergraduate 
students and studied the relationships between a number of psychological variables and a 
newly developed Proclivity to Apologize Measure (“PAM”).  The Proclivity to 




after an interpersonal transgression.  The PAM correlated positively with seeking 
forgiveness (r=.17; α=.96), self-esteem (r=.24; α=.87), neuroticism (r=.29; α=.66), 
agreeableness (r=.28; α=.60), compassion and other positive emotions (r=.39; α=.87), 
autonomy (r=.26; α=.67), and competence (r=.22; α=.65); and correlates negatively with 
self-monitoring (r=-.36; α=.62), narcissism (r=-.20; α=.84), and entitlement (r=-.15; 
α=.82). Thus, the PAM is positively correlated with traits such as compassion and 
autonomy that are indicative of adaptive social functioning, and negatively correlated 
with traits such as entitlement and narcissism that are less adaptive socially (Howell et 
al., 2011).   
The PAM findings suggest that individuals may vary in their predisposition to 
apologize.   Lazare (2004) considers the factors that motivate people to apologize, noting 
a number of individual differences that manifest into apology triggers in certain contexts.  
These include (i) compassion for others; (ii) guilt and/or shame centered on a specific 
incident; (iii) self-monitoring; and (iv) a desire to maintain relations and social harmony.    
The latter two factors may be considered more interpersonally strategic in nature, while 
the first two are internal and are related to the idea that an apology “demonstrates the 
offenders’ recognition of and concern for the victims’ suffering” (Fehr & Gelfand, 2010, 
p. 38).  It is worth noting that while both Lazare and the PAM view compassion as a 
factor that is tied to apologizing, they differ in their views of self-monitoring: Lazare 
asserts that it is positively linked to apologizing, and the PAM finds that it is negatively 
linked.  
Tangney and colleagues (e.g. Tangney, Youman, & Steuwig, 2009) further 




empathy first and then apologies.   Building on the fundamental role of guilt in the 
apology process, Leunissen, De Cremer, Folmer, and van Dijke (2013) contrast the 
psychological needs of offender and offended, and find that offenders prefer to offer 
apologies after unintentional and not intentional transgressions.  They argue that this is 
because offenders’ guilt and empathy is stronger following unintended misdeeds because 
offenders don’t have the opportunity to rationalize their bad behavior beforehand. 
Scholars have also assessed the reasons why individuals are reluctant to 
apologize, though these generally represent theoretical arguments that have yet to be 
tested empirically.  Tavuchis (1991) argued that in order to apologize individuals must 
overcome a natural disinclination to do so, related to individuals’ fear of rejection.  
Indeed, an apology is seen as tantamount to surrendering power to the victim (Leunissen, 
2014).  This is consistent with the notion that one needs courage to apologize (Lazare, 
2004), due in part to the fact that following an apology one runs the risk of losing face or 
otherwise making a bad situation worse (Kellogg, 2007).   
Lazare (2004) expands upon this rationale by contending that individuals are 
averse to apologizing for a myriad of reasons, including: (i) a fear of the reaction of the 
other party; (ii) embarrassment and the idea that an apology makes one appear weak; (iii) 
a lack of awareness that the other party is offended; and (iv) a lack of efficacy 
surrounding the act of apologizing. Chapman and Thomas (2008) weigh in with a slightly 
different take, advancing the notion that people refuse to apologize because (i) they don’t 
believe it’s worth the effort; (ii) they believe the other party was at fault; and (iii) they 




some offenders may see their behavior as justified and thus not meriting an apology 
(Leunissen, 2014).  
The arguments outlined above represent a window into the psyche of a would-be 
– and generally reluctant - apologizer.  Moreover, at least one article empirically 
demonstrated that refusing to apologize may be beneficial to one’s psyche, thereby 
perhaps justifying our reluctance to apologize.  Across two studies, Okimoto, et al. 
(2013) considered whether refusing to apologize is positively associated with a sense of 
power, value integrity, and self-esteem.  In the first study, participants were asked to 
recall an instance in which they either refused to apologize, offered an apology, or took 
no apologetic action: the researchers then measured how participants felt about 
themselves after the situation.  In the second study, participants were asked to recall an 
instance in which they had offended someone; the researchers then manipulated whether 
participants apologized or not, after which participants were asked how they felt about 
themselves.   
In both studies participants who refused to apologize reported greater 
power/control and value integrity; in addition, these mediated the relationship between 
refusal to apologize and greater self-esteem (Okimoto et al., 2013). Refusing to apologize 
is thus seen as a way to feel more empowered, and an individual’s refusal to apologize 
might be motivated by basic human needs for autonomy and consistency (Okimoto et al., 
2013).  It is interesting to consider these findings relative to the previously mentioned 
PAM study, which in a similar vein suggested that one’s tendency to apologize is 




consciously or not - those with self-esteem or autonomy concerns may not want to 
exacerbate these concerns by apologizing.   
Notwithstanding theoretical arguments concerning one’s willingness or 
unwillingness to apologize, there is a notable lack of empirical support for these 
contentions, with few exceptions.  A paper by Exline, Deshea, and Holeman (2007) is 
one of the few to introduce and test a framework of situational factors predicting 
apologies, drawing from the justice literature to propose a set of conditions under which 
individuals are likely to apologize.  Building on the arguments of Lazare, among others, 
Exline and colleagues suggest that there are two broad categories that compel offenders 
to apologize to victims: (i) these offenders see themselves as clearly responsible for an 
injustice; and/or (ii) they view their pre-existing relationship with victims as closer or 
more committed than do those who don’t apologize.  Exline et al. showed in a within-
subject design that apologies were indeed more likely in situations in which the offender 
felt genuine remorse, and in which the offender felt closer to the victim.  Moreover, in 
response to open-ended questions concerning apology motives, the two most common 
responses were a desire to help the other person or the relationship (51% of respondents), 
and a desire to relieve guilt (39%). 
The two broad apology criteria established by Exline and colleagues, which are 
consistent with earlier theorizing by Lazare and Tavuchis – offenders’ relational concerns 
and feelings of remorse - serve as the general foundation for my hypotheses concerning 
apologies, power, and status.  More specifically, I argue that the possession of high or 





Power and Status     
The theoretical support for making divergent predictions about how those with 
power or status might behave in certain situations is rooted in social psychology. There 
have been important conceptual refinements in the power and status literature over the 
last 20 years, including the notion that power and status are theoretically distinct 
constructs (e.g. Fiske, 1993; Fragale, Overbeck, & Neale, 2011; Keltner, Gruenfeld, 
Anderson, 2003).  Indeed, scholars are beginning to parse out the differing psychological 
effects of status and power (Blader & Chen, 2012; Blader et al., 2016; Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008).  I will draw on these perspectives in the conceptualizations of power 
and status that follow. 
Power is defined as control over critical resources and valued outcomes within a 
set of social relations (Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008).  More 
specifically, power typically entails the control over money, information, or decision-
making (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012; French & Raven, 1959).  By contrast, status is 
conceptualized as the prestige, respect, admiration, and esteem that a party has in the eyes 
of others (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Fiske, 2010; Fragale, et al., 2011; Magee & 
Galinksy, 2008).  I chose these definitions of power and status because they represent the 
current consensus within the psychology and management fields, particularly regarding 
those studies which seek to disentangle the effects of power and status.  Importantly, as 
defined in this literature, hierarchical position or ranking is not a necessary condition of 
either power or status, though in practice it frequently goes hand in hand with one or both 
of these factors.   Moreover, while I define power in terms of extrinsic resources, it also 




One critical distinction between power and status that is highly relevant to my 
argument is that status is conferred via the judgments and evaluations of others, while 
power is considered more a property of the individual actor in a given context, and is thus 
less reliant on external judgments (Magee & Galinksy, 2008; Blader & Chen, 2012).  
This fundamental contrast has significant implications for individuals’ motivation and 
behavior including, I argue, their willingness to apologize.   
In the sections below I review extant theory concerning power and status.   I 
organize my review around high and low dichotomies of power and status because I 
make hypotheses about the willingness to apologize on this basis.  The reason why I 
dichotomize what is a continuous variable by nature is that I consider this a reasonable 
simplification, taking into account the relatively limited amount of research on the topic.  
As researchers consider the different effects of power and status, the field has largely 
structured the inquiry around these two groupings, high and low; this practice is 
normative in the field (e.g. Blader & Chen, 2012; Blader et al., 2016).  I further argue that 
in practice individuals place interaction partners into these high and low buckets in order 
to determine how to approach these partners.  Moreover, I think that these groupings are 
even more applicable to my study because I don’t consider a history between the two 
parties: In this context, I argue that one is even more likely to place oneself or another 
person into a binary group as a simplifying assumption.   
High Power 
The power-as-control theory (Fiske, 1993), and the approach/inhibition theory of 
power (Keltner, et al., 2003), provide a theoretical foundation for making predictions 




theories, those with relatively high power experience fewer social/normative constraints 
and exhibit tendencies of an activated approach system, including more automatic 
information processing and less inhibited behavior (Fiske, 1993; Keltner, et al., 2003).  
Further, high power individuals are able to block out peripheral information and focus on 
task relevant information (Guinote, 2007). 
As it relates to the automaticity of social cognition, Keltner et al. (2003) propose 
that high power individuals “should tend to judge others’ attitudes, interests, and 
positions less accurately” (p. 273).  This is largely because high power individuals 
engage in more heuristic assessments of others (Keltner et al., 2003).  This builds upon 
basic tenets in power-as-control theory, which suggests that those with power are 
unmotivated to pay attention to those without power (Fiske, 1993).  Relatedly, it has been 
experimentally shown that high power individuals are poorer judges of others’ emotions 
than are low power individuals (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & 
Gruenfeld, 2006), and engage in less perspective taking (Blader et al., 2016).  
Further, higher-power individuals – after learning of another’s suffering - 
experience less reciprocal emotion (i.e. distress) and less complementary emotion (i.e. 
compassion) than lower-power individuals (van Kleef, Oveis, van der Lowe, LuoKogan, 
Goetz, & Keltner, 2008).   Evidence suggests that these social interaction effects may be 
related to brain function.  Indeed, Hogeveen, Inzlicht, and Obhi (2014) found that those 
primed with high power demonstrated lower levels of motor resonance – a neural 
mechanism in which one’s brain activity mirrors that of another person - than those with 
low power.  Thus, there could in fact be a neurological underpinning to the tendency of 




Relative to my argument, the above are factors that could tie into one’s proclivity 
to apologize or not.  For one, the preceding logic can be linked to the baseline premise 
that in order to apologize one must feel guilty for an offensive act (Exline et al., 2007).  
Those with high power may not feel as responsible for an offensive act because they are 
less cognizant of the negative implications for the victim; they are also less likely to be 
aware of or feel compassion toward the victim (van Kleef et al., 2008).   Indeed, Kim et 
al. (2009) argue that one of the fundamental complications in trust repair is the fact that 
the offender often does not realize that trust has been violated.   
Moreover, power has been shown to foster self-interested behavior and moral 
hypocrisy, in which individuals place strict moral standards on other people yet engage in 
less strict behavior themselves (Galinsky et al., 2006; Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 
2010).  Relatedly, those with high power experience less social pressure with regard to 
the attitudes that they form (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).   The result is that those with high 
power are more likely to feel justified in their behavior, to consider the other party at 
fault, and to be emotionally detached, making these individuals less willing to apologize.   
Further, the second pillar of apologizing – the existence of a closer, more 
committed relationship –provides an additional basis for the argument that those with 
high power are less willing to apologize.  This is because power creates social distance 
and with it the tendency to stereotype and objectify others, and to treat them 
instrumentally (Fiske, 1993; Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Magee & 
Smith, 2013).  For instance, Kipnis (1972) showed that those with greater power create 
psychological distance between themselves and those with less power, and tend to view 




that those with greater power will struggle to maintain ‘close and friendly relations’ with 
those with lesser power (Kipnis, 1972).   Magee and Smith (2013) further theorize that 
because those with high power are less dependent on the views and actions of those with 
less power, this reduces their motivation to affiliate with these individuals. 
From a relational perspective, those with high power seemingly have more 
discretion concerning whether to apologize or not because the source of their power is not 
rooted in their relationship with others.   Thus they may feel less inclined to invest 
emotional energy in apologizing in order to demonstrate their commitment to a 
relationship.   Relatedly, those with high power possess a freedom from social norms, 
which creates flexibility in terms of how the powerful approach social situations (Blader 
& Chen, 2012).  One example of this phenomenon is the fact that high power is 
negatively associated with procedural and distributive justice exhibited towards others 
(Blader & Chen, 2012).  This tendency of those with high power to bypass the basic 
social norm of exhibiting fairness towards others is indicative of how those with high 
power view social obligations. 
A final point concerning the likelihood of one with high power apologizing is the 
idea that an apology itself entails proclaiming one’s helplessness and putting oneself at 
the mercy of another party (Tavuchis, 1991).  Indeed, Lazare (1995, p. 42) proffers: 
"What makes an apology work is the exchange of shame and power between the offender 
and the offended."  An apology thus represents a relinquishment of power by one 
individual to another, placing the other party in a more dominant role (Schneider, 2000; 
Exline et al., 2007).  Within the context of the dyadic relationship, the victim - and 




recipient of the apology has the power to decide whether or not to accept the apology: 
this is a level of vulnerability that those with high power might seek to avoid.  Indeed, 
Exline and Baumeister (2001) argue that a fear of apologizing and the associated 
vulnerability should be especially salient for offenders who desire to maintain dominance 
within a relationship.  Taken as a whole these arguments suggest that those with high 
power will be less inclined to apologize than those in an experimental control condition.   
Hypothesis 1:  Individuals with high power will be less willing to apologize (vs. 
control). 
Low Power 
For those with low power the world is a vastly different, and potentially perilous, 
place due to their lack of control over valued outcomes (Fiske, 2010).  One result is that 
those with low power have a heightened sensitivity to threat and punishment (Keltner et 
al., 2003).  This supports the idea that those with low power will be more willing to 
apologize, in an attempt to avoid punishment for a negative act.  Moreover, one 
implication of a relative lack of control is that low-power individuals will be more 
influenced by situational demands (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 
2008).  In addition, individuals with low power will feel less autonomy due to their 
relative paucity of resources (Fiske, 1993).   
These fundamental aspects of low power, (i) situational predominance, and (ii) 
lack of autonomy, suggest that those with low power will be more willing to apologize.  
First, the act of apologizing after committing an interpersonal offense is considered a 
normative response to resolve a conflict (Tavuchis, 1991).    Second, those without a 




In addition, I expect that those with low power will be more likely to recognize 
that an apology is required.  For one, those with low power are more likely to engage in 
perspective taking (Galinsky et al., 2006).  In one demonstration of this idea, those 
primed with low power (vs. high power) were better able to adopt another person’s 
perspective (Galinsky et al., 2006).  This perspective-taking effect can also lead to 
misjudgments: for example, low-power individuals tend to overestimate negative 
emotions in their supervisors relative to the emotions that these individuals actually felt 
(Anderson & Berdahl, 2002).  Thus, those with low power are more likely to take the 
victim’s point of view and recognize that this person requires an apology.  Indeed, the 
low power person is more likely to apologize for even minor issues because he/she might 
perceive victims to be more upset than they really are. 
In addition, those with low power are expected to undergo more complex 
reasoning in assessing their social relations, and to assume a more strategic posture 
(Keltner et al., 2003).   In this sense, low power-holders should be more committed to 
preserving their existing relationships because of their relative dependency on other 
individuals.  Supportive of this notion, those with low power must often inhibit their 
desires in order to avoid negative consequences (Keltner et al., 2003).  Taking this factor 
into account, there is a greater likelihood that those with low power will apologize simply 
to placate an aggrieved party.   







  With regard to status, status maintenance concerns focus one’s attention outward 
to social entities (Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006).  This is because status is 
necessarily conferred by others via social processes (Blau, 1964).  Indeed, status by 
definition cannot be held unless targets willingly choose to grant it (Fragale et al., 2011).  
Thus status, unlike power, is a property not so much of the individual actor but of 
observers (Magee & Galinksy, 2008).  I argue that because status is derived through our 
relationships with others, it will affect one’s inclination to apologize, particularly since 
apologies are delivered in order to influence how others perceive and behave towards us 
(Lazare, 2004).     
There are prior studies that address the relationship between status and 
apologizing; however either the findings were inconclusive, or the operationalization of 
status was more closely related to our current conceptualization of power.  To wit, 
Holmes (1990) considered apologies and status but operationalized status as the extent to 
which one can impose his/her plans on others, which is more akin to power as I’ve 
defined it.  In a sample of apologies, Holmes (1990) found that while offenders of equal 
status with victims most often delivered apologies (63% of the time), offenders with 
lower status than victims delivered almost twice as many apologies upward (23.5%) as 
offenders with higher status delivered downward (13.1%).   
Gonzales, Pederson, Manning, and Wetter (1990) also studied the link between 
status and apologies. The theoretical underpinning for their hypothesizing was Brown and 
Levinson’s politeness theory (1978), which suggests that those of lower status will tend 




status on the use of apologies.  However there are several important differences between 
this study and my dissertation.  In the Gonzales study, status was operationalized as 
hierarchical status, which relates to one’s ranking within a social setting.  Moreover, this 
study was focused on the broader concept of accounts, which are verbal explanations of 
misbehavior that include not only apologies but also concessions, excuses, justifications, 
and refusals (Gonzales et al., 1990).   
Further, in a vignette study involving an instance of a broken promise at work, 
Takaku (2000) found that status – operationalized as hierarchical rank - did not influence 
Americans’ views on the appropriateness of an apology versus a justification.  This view 
was in contrast to that of Japanese participants, who felt that an apology was more 
appropriate than a justification when a lower status individual breaks a promise to a 
higher status individual, as compared to when a higher status individual breaks a promise.      
Returning to my argument, in order to achieve and maintain status one must be 
pleasing in the eyes of external parties.  Social groups convey status to an individual 
based on attributions that members make about that individual (Hogg, 2001).  The 
individual with high status is perceived not only to possess superior skills and abilities, 
but also the willingness to use these talents to benefit the group (Fragale et al., 2011).   In 
this way, high status carries with it expectations concerning appropriate behavior, to the 
extent that those with high status are seen as having responsibility for those around them 
(Fiske, 1992).  Magee and Galinsky (2008, p. 360), in reviewing prior status literature, 
assert that “status emerges from expectations that individuals have for their own and each 




Consistent with this premise, Blader and Chen (2012) argue that high status 
individuals will be highly attuned to the impressions that others form of them, and will 
thus be motivated to behave in a respectable manner.   An apology would appear to fall 
into this category of respectable behavior (Tedeschi & Norman, 1985).  Indeed, Tedeschi 
and Norman (1985) classify an apology as “defensive-tactical” impression management 
behavior, intended to repair damaged identities.  Hogan and Emler (1981) theorize that 
those with high status must be careful not to give “gratuitous public offense”.  I submit 
that one way to avoid offending is to apologize after a questionable act. 
Moreover, one of the ways that individuals who want greater status can attain it is 
through displays of generosity and selflessness (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009).  
Additionally, Blader and Chen (2012) found that psychological status was positively 
associated with exhibiting procedural and distributive justice towards others.  These 
findings all support the idea that those with high status tend to behave in positive ways in 
order to manage the social judgments that others form of them.  Thus, I expect that a high 
status offender will consider issuing an apology in order to repair the damaged 
impression that a victim has of him/her. 
Perhaps even more relevant to my argument, Blader et al. (2016) theorized and 
found that high status enhances perspective taking.  This directly ties into one’s 
willingness to apologize in that by considering another person’s perspective, one is more 
likely to recognize that this party has been offended by one’s actions.  This in turn makes 
one more likely to feel responsible for a negative act, and thus ultimately more willing to 




The second big theoretical driver of apologies – the existence of a closer, more 
committed relationship – is also supportive of the idea that high status individuals will be 
more willing to apologize.   Individuals with high status should be generally committed 
to their existing relationships because these relationships are the source of their status in 
the first place.  Moreover, individuals with high status are more prone to see their 
existing relationships in a positive light.  Indeed, Lount and Pettit (2012) argue that high 
status triggers an expectation that others will have favorable motives and exhibit positive 
behaviors towards them.  These researchers found that high status led people to initially 
trust others more, and this was mediated by a belief that others have positive intentions 
toward them (Lount & Pettit 2012).   
Similarly, Pettit and Sivanathan (2012) argue that high status arouses a set of 
expectations around the social rewards (e.g. displays of respect, approval, appreciation, 
and praise) that those with high status will receive due to their elevated position.   
Supportive of this contention, Pettit and Sivanathan (2012) experimentally found that 
those in high status positions reported hearing applause as louder and seeing facial 
expressions as more favorable.  Moreover, this effect was mediated by expectations of 
how others would respond: that is those with high status had higher expectations of how 
the audience would respond (e.g. I expect to hear applause, rated on a seven-point scale) 
than those with low status.   
One takeaway from these two studies is that those with high status are more likely 
to feel confident in how others will respond to them.   As it relates to the apology process, 
I suggest that high status individuals are more likely to expect that their apology will be 




important as the prospect of rejection is a key deterrent for apologizing (Lazare, 2004).   
Indeed, the instrumental perspective on apologies suggests that individuals are more 
likely to apologize when they believe that they will be forgiven by the victim (Exline et 
al., 2007; Leunissen et al., 2012). 
A final argument for why those with high status are more likely to apologize is 
that they are loathe to lose the public standing that they possess, and will expend 
considerable effort to maintain this standing, including presumably the delivery of an 
apology.  Pettit, Yong, and Spataro (2010), building on classic work on gain/loss frames 
(e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) found that individuals attach greater value to status 
when recalling the risk of status loss than when recalling the potential for status gain.  
Further, individuals are willing to pay more to avoid a status loss than to achieve a status 
gain, and put forth greater effort when striving to prevent status loss than when striving to 
gain status.  As previously argued, apologizing often requires considerable psychic pain 
and effort.  Nonetheless, assuming that individuals see apologies as a status-maintenance 
act, these findings suggest that high status individuals are likely to apologize in order to 
preserve their privileged social standing.   
It is important to note that idiosyncratic credit theory (Hollander, 1958) suggests 
that those with high status may be less willing to apologize.  This theory holds that those 
with high status can behave in certain unexpected ways once they are established within a 
group and not lose standing: essentially high status holders accrue social credits that can 
then be depleted if the person with high status behaves in a peculiar manner (Hollander, 
1958).  Thus, according to this theory, a high status individual can presumably afford not 




However, I argue that an apology can be a quick and effective way for the high 
status holder to replenish the idiosyncratic credit account that was depleted by the 
original offensive act.  As such, I suggest that high status holders might be inclined to 
take advantage of this opportunity to rebuild the account, particularly if it has been 
cumulatively diminished by other actions.  In this way my hypothesis concerning high 
status and apologies is not wholly inconsistent with idiosyncratic theory.  At the same 
time, it is likely that high status holders will not be compelled to apologize for all 
offenses.  Perhaps high status individuals will apologize only in those instances in which 
they believe the apology will materially boost their idiosyncratic credit account.       
In sum, for all of these reasons I argue that those with high status will be more 
inclined to apologize than those in a control condition. 
Hypothesis 3:  Individuals with high status will be more willing to apologize (vs. 
control). 
Low Status 
 By contrast, there are both instrumental and relational reasons why those with low 
status might be less willing to apologize.  I make this contention despite the fact that one 
could also argue that low status individuals may feel some sort of obligation to apologize 
out of deference, particularly in a context in which they are interacting with high status 
people.  For one, individuals with low status have reason to be skeptical about the quality 
of their interpersonal ties, as their peers generally view them with less respect and 
admiration (Blader & Chen, 2012).  As a result, they cannot be confident that their 
apologies will be accepted, an important precondition to apologizing (Leunissen et al., 




may in fact confirm to others that they are not trustworthy, which may in turn impair their 
ability to gain status in the future.  Thus the implication for those with low status is that 
the act of apologizing - which even in the best of cases carries social risk - is even riskier 
for them compared to those with higher status.   
Further, for those with low status, relationships tend to be less consensual 
(Fragale et al., 2011).  As a result, low status individuals are likely to feel a lack of 
relational commitment from their social counterparts.  This is because those with low 
status are aware that they are not as respected or viewed as favorably as others 
(Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006).  Principles of reciprocity and 
social exchange suggest that those who experience a lack of commitment from others will 
feel less committed in return (Cialdini, 1993).  This is a problem as relational 
commitment is a significant factor in compelling individuals to overcome the natural 
tendency not to apologize (Leunissen, 2014).  As a result, those with low status should be 
less willing to apologize. 
Behavioral confirmation theory (Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977) buttresses 
the prediction that those with low status will be less willing to apologize.  This theory 
holds that people will tend to behave in ways that conform to the views that others have 
of them (Snyder, et al., 1977).   As it relates to my argument, individuals with low status 
in a particular social context would be expected to behave less admirably within this 
context by those around them.  Low status individuals are more likely to feel that an 
interpersonal transgression on their part is expected by the group, and as a result might 
conform to this expectation and behave in such a negative manner.  Further, not 




because a sincere apology is an act of strong moral character and integrity.   This in turn 
should make individuals with low status less willing to apologize. 
Hypothesis 4:  Individuals with low status will be less willing to apologize (vs. 
control). 
Interaction of High/Low Power and High/Low Status 
I have argued that high power and low status, respectively, will tend to make 
individuals less willing to apologize, while low power and high status, respectively, will 
tend to make individuals more willing to apologize.  But it is important to also consider 
the interaction of these variables, as there are many roles in society in which individuals 
possess some combination of these factors.  For example, IRS agents are generally 
considered to have high power but low status, while social workers frequently have high 
status but low power.  Moreover, there is surprisingly little work on the interaction of 
these two variables, as some researchers have noted (Fast, Halevy, & Galinsky, 2012). 
My core premise is that status exerts a greater impact than power in the apology 
process.  The support for this contention rests on the fundamental tenets of image 
restoration theory (Benoit, 1995), and the notion that the maintenance of one’s image in a 
social context is paramount.  Image restoration theory is concerned with the strategies 
that both personal and organizational offenders can employ in order to restore their image 
or reputation after committing an offensive act.   The theory rests on two assumptions.  
The first is that communication is a goal directed activity.  Actors will consider salient 
goals and issue communication in furtherance of these goals, assuming that the cost of 





The second assumption is that a key consideration in communication is to 
maintain and repair one’s reputation (Benoit, 1995).   Reputation has been defined as the 
set of beliefs, perceptions, and evaluations that a group forms about an individual 
member (Anderson & Shirako, 2008).  In this way the theory builds upon Goffman’s 
(1967) contention that individuals will strive to preserve their face, particularly if it is 
threatened.  Benoit (1995) further argues that people are concerned with their reputation 
for two principal reasons.  First, one’s reputation is linked to one’s self-image; second, 
one’s reputation is critical to the degree of influence that one possesses (Benoit, 1995).   
This is because a positive reputation within one’s community results in greater status in 
that community (Anderson & Shirako, 2008). 
One implication of this theory is that when one’s positive reputation is threatened 
– as it would be after an offensive act - one will be compelled to take action to restore 
this reputation.  This assumes that the offender is aware that he/she has offended.  One of 
the prescribed actions, according to the theory, is an apology.  This is consistent with 
Lazare’s (2004) argument that offenders often apologize in order to maintain social 
support.   Thus, a high status offender, when facing a situation in which he/she has 
committed an offensive act, would be primarily concerned with preserving his/her 
reputation in order to maintain a high status level.  Moreover, in this situation one’s level 
of power should not be of paramount importance since power – as defined herein - will 
not be impacted by the issuance or non-issuance of the apology.   
An additional argument for the dominance of status over power is the idea that 
status is the more socially fluid construct.  This is because status hinges on the views of 




is more fixed and less subject to change.   As a result, status concerns would be more 
prominent in one’s mind given that there is a greater opportunity for status to be altered, 
even for those with high power who are less reliant on others.   
Given these arguments concerning high status, combined with my earlier ones 
regarding low power, individuals possessing both of these factors should be most inclined 
to apologize.  However, for those who possess both high status and high power, I have 
argued for opposing inclinations.  Nonetheless, one of the implications of high power is 
the more effective pursuit of goals (Guinote, 2007).  Since my argument centers on the 
idea that a key goal of high status individuals is to maintain their status level, those with 
high status and high power should be more willing to apologize because it is in keeping 
with their overarching goal of preserving high status.  Thus individuals with both high 
status and high power should be more willing to apologize. 
In sum, with respect to this interaction, I argue that one’s status will be a more 
impactful factor than one’s power in determining whether one tends to apologize after a 
transgression.  That is to say, under conditions of high status I predict that individuals 
will be more willing to apologize than those in a control condition, regardless of their 
level of power.  Conversely, under conditions of low status, individuals will be less 
willing to apologize, again regardless of their level of power.   
Hypothesis 5:  Individuals with high status will be more willing to apologize (vs. 
control), regardless of whether they have high power, low power, or control power. 
In the case of low status offenders, their status is impaired even before 
committing the offensive act.  As a result, there is less incentive to issue an apology for 




expected to have a positive impact on one’s social standing, presumably cannot transform 
a low status individual into a high status one.  This is in line with my earlier argument 
about the negative association between low status and apologies.   
Thus, I expect those with low status and high power to be the least willing to 
apologize.  For those with low status and low power, an argument can be made on both 
sides.  Indeed, I have hypothesized that low power will increase one’s willingness to 
apologize because low power individuals are better at perspective taking and are more 
strategic in their social interactions.  Nonetheless, I predict that the possession of low 
status will override these tendencies as it relates to apologies.  To support this premise, I 
return to my general argument about low status individuals and apologies: because these 
individuals have less to gain from an apology, and because they can have less confidence 
that their apology will be accepted, they are less likely to bear the interpersonal costs and 
risks of issuing one.   
Hypothesis 6:  Individuals with low status will be less willing to apologize (vs. 




Chapter 3: Apologies and Perceived Dominance and Warmth 
Apologies, Power, Status, and Influence 
 
 Thus far I have argued that power and status exert varying intrapersonal influence 
on the apology process.  It is also important to consider the interpersonal impact of power 
and status as it relates to apologies.  To reiterate, I define power as control over critical 
resources and valued outcomes; and I define status as the prestige, respect, admiration, 
and esteem that one possesses from others (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).  Power is thus 
derived independently from the social judgments of others, while status derives directly 
from these social judgments.  
Despite the substantial differences between power and status that I have 
enumerated in the previous chapter, there is one fundamental similarity: both power and 
status are routes to potential influence over others (French & Raven, 1959; Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008).  In other words, people are more likely to follow the directives of an 
individual who either controls valued resources or who they highly regard (Fragale et al., 
2011).   Power, status, and influence are thus inexorably linked.  Due to this fact, as well 
as to the general importance of influence in social and organizational settings, I will focus 
my inquiry on the impact that an apology has on one’s degree of social influence.   
The distinction between power and status - and the distinction between these two 
constructs and influence - is fundamental to my hypothesizing.  Power and status have 
often been thought of in terms of capability to influence; that is, these constructs were 
defined and measured based on how much influence one possessed.  However, Magee 
and Galinsky (2008) hold that while influence has traditionally been considered a 




Thus influence is a dependent variable in this conceptualization: the possession of power 
and/or status shapes one’s capacity to influence others.  In this way power, status, and 
influence are conceptually distinct (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).      
Social influence is an important concern for humans, going back to our ancestors 
who utilized influence tactics for reasons of survival and reproduction (Sundie, Cialdini, 
Griskevicius, & Kenrick, 2012).  Indeed, a core social motive for humans is a desire to 
maximize one’s ability to influence others (Tedeschi & Norman, 1985).  It is thus 
understandable why those with high power or high status would seek to maintain their 
social influence, particularly after committing an offensive act that might serve to 
alienate others and chip away at one’s influence.  From a research perspective, my 
objective is to hone in on how apologies impact the influence process with the two 
groups that typically harbor the most interpersonal influence, those with high power 
and/or high status.    
I approach this study of apologies and the influence process via an examination of 
the social judgments that others hold of those with high power and high status following 
an apology. While high power and high status both impact one’s degree of influence, they 
may elicit different social judgments that in turn impact the influence process (Fragale et 
al., 2011).  I focus on perceptions of one’s warmth and dominance. These social 
judgments are conceptually distinct from high power and high status, despite the fact that 
status itself is a form of social judgment.  Nonetheless these constructs are linked because 
the possession of high power and/or high status helps to shape warmth and dominance 




overview of the theoretical support for the idea that an apology can ultimately shape 
one’s level of influence. 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model and Influence 
My argument is centered on the notion that apologies from high status or high 
power individuals help to shape their interpersonal influence following an offensive act.  
Further, I argue that this occurs via the social judgments that others make about these 
individuals after they apologize.  It is important to embed my model into a contextual 
theory of influence.  Several theories address the influence process, and one of the most 
prominent of these is the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM).  The ELM is applicable 
to my argument in that it helps explain how social judgments made by a target about 
another individual can lead to increased influence for that individual.   
The ELM, developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986) as a comprehensive theory 
encompassing many prior persuasion theories and frameworks, addresses the cognitive 
processes that occur within targets of influence.  The ELM reflects a dual system 
approach to judgment, and holds that there are two routes to influence, the central route 
and the peripheral route (Petty & Brinol, 2012).  The central, or elaborated, route is the 
more cognitively sophisticated of the two, and involves a target’s rational processing of 
information, arguments, and evidence (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).   In order for the target 
to be changed or persuaded, the target must be both motivated and capable of 
understanding the information presented.   
By contrast, the peripheral - or low route - involves persuasion at a more 
emotional level.  Within the context of the peripheral route, attitudes can be shaped by 




perceptions on the part of the target.  My model concerning the aftermath of an apology 
is best understood within the context of this peripheral route, although an apology can 
certainly lead to higher levels of cognitive processing by the target as well. 
Importantly for my hypothesizing, the ELM holds that source variables fall under 
the auspices of peripheral cues.  These source factors are aspects of the individual who 
delivers the message, as perceived by the target (Petty & Brinol, 2015).  Two of these 
source factors are directly related to my model.  The first of these is the target’s 
perception of the source’s authority (Cialdini, 1994; Petty & Brinol, 2015).  The 
implication is that more the source is viewed as powerful or authoritative, the more 
influence this person will possess.  This notion of authority is directly tied to the 
perception of dominance that I have chosen to study.  The second peripheral cue relevant 
for my argument is whether one is liked by a target: the more one is liked, the more 
influence he/she will possess (Cialdini, 1994; Petty & Brinol, 2015).  Likeability is 
related to warmth, which is the second social judgment that I study.   
Thus, the ELM provides broad theoretical support for my contention that the 
social judgments that the victim makes about the offending party will result in that party 
having more influence following an apology.   More specifically, warmth and dominance 
perceptions act as peripheral cues in the influence process.  I will now provide a more 
detailed description of the social judgments dominance and warmth, and present my 
argument concerning how apologies from high status/high power individuals impact 






Social Judgments: Warmth and Dominance 
Social judgments are made as individuals engage in social learning, which 
involves obtaining information about and making assessments of others (Lee & Harris, 
2014).  Social judgments involve the characteristics that others attribute to a party, and 
the study and categorization of these trait attributions has a long history in social 
psychology (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2006).  Fundamentally all individuals, upon 
encountering others in their environment, must determine the intentions and capabilities 
of these other parties (Fiske, et al., 2006).  This person perception process is often 
spontaneous, and has been shown to have a neurological basis (Fiske & Taylor, 2013; 
Lee & Harris, 2014).  Further, the impressions that people form about others greatly 
shape the nature of their interactions with others (Fragale et al., 2011). 
Consistent with the ELM, the social judgments that others make about us helps to 
determine our degree of influence.  Two social judgments that directly relate to one’s 
influence are others’ perceptions of one’s warmth, and their perceptions of one’s 
dominance (Cialdini, 1993).  The warmth dimension refers to the perception of one’s 
positive intentions towards others, and encapsulates traits including friendliness, 
helpfulness, sincerity, trustworthiness, and morality (Fiske et al., 2006; Fragale et al., 
2011).  By contrast dominance is traditionally seen as the perception of one’s tendency to 
behave in a self-assured manner, and captures traits including ambition, assertiveness, 
decisiveness, and forcefulness, among others (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014; Anderson & 
Kilduff, 2009; Fragale et al., 2011).   Warmth is considered the primary social judgment 
because it is the first judgment that people make, and it accounts for the most variance in 




warmth can be seen in evolutionary terms as a key to survival is to first determine another 
party’s intentions before assessing their capabilities.     
Warmth is deemed by scholars to be one of the two fundamental dimensions of 
social judgment, along with competence, though competence and dominance share many 
qualities (Abele, Cuddy, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2008; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Freddi, 
Tessier, Lacrampe, & Dru, 2013).  Nonetheless, while dominance and competence 
perceptions are closely related, I have chosen to focus my inquiry on dominance rather 
than competence as I believe it is more relevant to the context that I am studying.  That is, 
dominance, rather than competence, taps more into the emotional aspect of apology 
process.  Moreover, dominance is more traditionally tied to influence, having been linked 
to leadership as well as to influence in smaller group settings (Lord, De Vader, & Alliger, 
1986; Anderson & Kilduff, 2009).   In addition, my model builds upon prior, related 
studies concerning the linkages between power, status, warmth and dominance. 
 Further, the focus on two dimensions of social judgment harkens back to prior 
two-fold conceptualizations in the literature including power vs. love, and agency vs. 
communion (Celik, Lammers, van Beest, Bekker, and Vonk, 2013).   Indeed, scholars 
argue that the existence of two broad classes of social judgment are universally present in 
the perception of not just others, but also the self and social groups (Abele & Wojciszke, 
2014).   
Given the critical link between perceptions of warmth and dominance and one’s 
degree of influence, Fragale et al. (2011) linked high and low power, and high and low 
status, to these perceptions.  The primary goal was to determine whether power and status 




would positively predict a target’s perceived dominance; but that high status would be 
positively related to perceived warmth while high power would be negatively related to 
perceived warmth.  Fragale et al. found support for their arguments, along with the 
premise that status acts as a moderator of the negative effect of power on warmth.  That 
is, when status is high, targets are perceived as warm regardless of their level of power.   
While the Fragale et al. findings are foundational, they don’t tell us anything 
about how the relationships between the variables may be impacted by specific types of 
social interactions including offensive acts and apologies.  This is significant as people 
purposefully engage in certain behaviors in order to appear warmer or more dominant 
(Holoien & Fiske, 2013).   For those with high power or high status, an apology may be 
an effective way to manage others’ perceptions of their warmth and dominance after an 
offensive act.   
Indeed, I hold that after offending another party, the act of apologizing– as 
opposed to not apologizing - will lead to increased perceptions of both warmth and 
dominance for those with high power and for those with high status.  My argument 
regarding dominance is particularly relevant to the apology process as a key reason why 
people are reluctant to apologize after an offensive act is a fear of appearing weak or 
inadequate (Lazare, 2004), i.e. appearing less dominant.  This is why I am focusing this 
study on the high power and high status conditions.  
My contention is that for those with high power or high status, an apology will not 
convey weakness, and may in fact convey strength, and thus this longstanding fear is 
overstated.  Supportive of this idea, Tucker et al., (2006) found that leaders who 




However, in this study the victim was subjected to a task-related mistake.   By contrast, I 
consider contexts in which the victim perceives an interpersonal exchange as offensive.   
Thus there are more likely to be emotional implications since negative interactions at 
work often result in emotional reactions for people (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996).     
I will now discuss in greater detail how high power and high status apologies 
should lead to enhanced perceptions of warmth and dominance.   
High Power/High Status Apologies and Perceived Warmth 
As previously outlined, much of our understanding of the consequences of 
apologies is rooted in impression management theory.  To this end, apologies can 
improve an offender’s situation in a number of important ways.  For example, apologies 
reduce the blame and anger that victims hold toward offenders, leading victims to punish 
offenders less severely (Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; 
DeCremer et al., 2010).  Conversely, in cases in which the offender fails to apologize, 
there are negative emotional repercussions.  Thomas and Millar (2008) found that 
participants were angrier at a confederate when the confederate had an opportunity to 
apologize and didn’t than when this person did not have the chance to apologize.   
However, as previously mentioned, apologies are not universally effective (e.g. 
Gold & Weiner, 2000; Skarlicki, Folger, & Gee, 2004).  To address this discrepancy in 
the literature, Hill (2014) conducted a meta-analysis linking apologies with a series of 
outcomes for offended parties: apologizing was significantly related to forgiveness (k = 
79, r = .32), positive attributions of the apologizer (k = 60, r = .24), and positive emotions 
toward the apologizer (k = 43, r = .33).  The latter two correlations provide compelling 




Apologies are able to accomplish this in part because they function as effective 
image restoration tools (Benoit, 1995; Benoit & Drew, 1997).  Apologies provide 
information to the victim about the nature of the offender (Tomlinson et al., 2004).  That 
is, apologies signal that transgressions should not be deemed a reflection of the offender’s 
true identity or intrinsic worth (Goffman, 1967; Ren & Gray, 2009).  In this way, an 
apology is expected to result in a more positive impression of the offender.  Therein lies 
the link between apologies and perceived warmth.  Perceptions of warmth are deemed 
positive, and are typically connected to characteristics such as friendliness, honesty, and 
good-naturedness (Tiedens & Jimenez, 2003).  Moreover, trustworthiness and likeability 
– both aforementioned outcomes of apologies – have been classified in the warmth 
dimension (Fiske et al., 2006).   
Further, there is some reason to believe that apologies from high power and high 
status offenders will be particularly impactful, although evidence is mixed.  Walfisch et 
al. (2013) found that apologies from high status others were shown to be more effective 
than apologies from low status others, with apology effectiveness operationalized as 
apology acceptance, willingness to forgive, and valuation of the offender.  In a separate 
study, supervisor apologies in the wake of interpersonal offenses were shown to 
positively impact follower trust in leadership, satisfaction with supervision, LMX quality, 
affective organizational commitment, and forgiveness (Basford et al., 2013).  By contrast, 
scholars have also shown that apologies from high power offenders are relatively 
ineffective at increasing forgiveness from low power victims, due to the cynicism with 





In sum, though evidence concerning the general effectiveness of apologies from 
high power and high status offenders is inconclusive, because apologies elicit positive 
thoughts and feelings from victims, they should enable high power and high status 
offenders to exude more warmth than if the offender had not apologized after an 
offensive act.  Thus, an apology – relative to no apology - is expected to enhance the 
feelings of warmth that victims have toward both high power and high status individuals. 
Hypothesis 7: Individuals with high status who apologize after an offensive act are 
perceived as warmer than individuals with high status who do not apologize. 
Hypothesis 8: Individuals with high power who apologize after an offensive act are 
perceived as warmer than individuals with high power who do not apologize. 
High Power/High Status Apologies and Perceived Dominance 
The perception of one’s dominance is of interest to those with power or status 
because, like warmth, it can shape the nature of one’s interactions with targets of 
influence.  Indeed, prior research holds that the relationship between perceived 
dominance and influence is reciprocal in nature (Fragale et al., 2011).  Despite this fact, 
dominance is a construct that frequently carries a negative connotation, and is often 
linked with aggressive, domineering, and controlling tendencies (Burgoon & Dunbar, 
2000; Ridgeway, 1987).  However, communication scholars Burgoon, Johnson, and Koch 
(1998) considered dominance from an interactionist perspective, arguing that perceptions 
of dominance are a byproduct of not only the focal party’s personality, but also the 
interaction between two parties.  This is relevant to the apology process in that an 




Burgoon et al. (1998) further argued that the negative conceptualization of 
dominance is too narrow and too pejorative; by contrast, they contend that socially 
competent behaviors lead to perceptions of dominance.  To this end Burgoon et al. (1998) 
factor-analyzed results from two different samples and found that dominance could be 
characterized as inclusive of components of poise, panache, self-assurance, 
persuasiveness, and conversational control.  Dominant individuals were further deemed 
to be more relaxed, composed, and expressive, and to initiate and coordinate 
conversation.  In a subsequent study, Burgoon and Dunbar (2000) found that self-
reported social skills – as measured by the Social Skills Inventory (Riggio, 1986) - were 
associated with perceptions of dominance as gauged by interaction partners, observers, 
and themselves. 
Because apologies fall into the category of behaviors that require social 
competence, I argue that they should lead to greater perceptions of dominance.  In 
particular, apologies demand that one be confident and self-assured, traits that fall under 
the dominance dimension (Wiggins, 1979).  As I have previously argued, apologies are 
difficult and at once require strength and vulnerability, a balance that requires adroit 
social skills. Indeed, an apology has been described as an act of courage in which one 
must first conquer one’s own fear (Tavuchis, 1991; Taft, 2000).  I expect recipients of 
apologies to recognize that apologizers are showing initiative and exhibiting strength in 
admitting fault, as opposed to shifting blame or denying their wrongdoing.   
Apologists must also convince the victim that the apology merits acceptance, 
which requires persuasiveness.  Further, in as much as an apology represents one’s 




to take the moral high road and shoulder social obligations, another sign of one’s 
strength.  These factors all increase the likelihood that one who apologizes will be viewed 
as more dominant than one who does not.   
Hypothesis 9: Individuals with high status who apologize after an offensive act are 
perceived as more dominant than individuals with high status who do not apologize.  
Hypothesis 10: Individuals with high power who apologize after an offensive act are 






Chapter 4: Mechanisms Underlying Power, Status, and the Willingness to Apologize 
In Chapter Two I explored whether high and low power, and high and low status, 
impact one’s willingness to apologize.  Nonetheless, we still don’t know precisely why 
this phenomenon occurs.  That is, we don’t fully understand the differing psychological 
processes that power and status exert as they relate to apologies.  For example, I have 
argued that high power and low status individuals, respectively, are more unwilling to 
apologize, but for different reasons.  This contention requires empirical study since the 
factors underlying why a high power or low status individual might avoid apologizing is 
an important research question that has yet to be addressed.  Moreover, from a practical 
standpoint, it is important to understand how contextual factors may influence one’s 
willingness to apologize so as to better address the underlying causes.   
Thus, I will focus on the psychological mechanisms that govern why high power 
and low status individuals are less willing to apologize, and why high status and low 
power individuals are more willing to apologize.   To do this I will introduce the 
constructs of remorse and instrumentality perceptions as potential mediating variables for 
power and status, respectively, and the willingness to apologize.  In sum, my purpose is 
to understand more completely the phenomenon of why those with high or low power, or 
high or low status, are willing to apologize or not.   
High Power and Remorse 
As I have previously argued, a principle reason why people fail to apologize is 
that they feel justified in their behavior and hence don’t experience guilt and remorse 
(Exline et al., 2007).  Offenders frequently view their actions as less harmful and more 




apologies (Exline & Baumeister, 2001).  Baumeister (1996) labeled this difference in 
perceptions between the offender and victim concerning the nature and seriousness of a 
transgression the “magnitude gap”.   Essentially I contend that the experience of high 
power, and the psychological distance that this creates vis-a-vis others, results in one 
being more susceptible to the magnitude gap (Magee & Smith, 2013).   
Remorse pertains to the negative feelings that one has relating to the 
consequences of one’s behavior (Davis & Gold, 2011; Brooks & Reddon, 2003).  To 
reiterate a point that I highlighted in Chapter Two, Exline et al. (2007) predicted and 
found that apologies were more likely than non-apologies in situations in which the 
offender felt genuine remorse.  Thus remorse can be seen as a precondition to apologies.  
Moreover, victims view remorse as a critical component in the apology process: 
perceived remorse reduces the blame and punishment-seeking of victims, and leads to 
increased levels of empathy and forgiveness (Davis & Gold, 2011; Darby & Schlenker, 
1982).  In sum, remorse is a fundamental part of the apology process, both for offenders 
and for victims, and can be seen as an intervening variable between high/low power and 
intent to apologize.   
I contend that remorse is an especially critical factor in the apology process for 
high power individuals because they are less likely to apologize for social reasons such as 
politeness or coercion.  This is because power reduces the impact of social disapproval 
(Emerson, 1962).  Further, the act of apologizing is a social norm, and power frees 
individuals from the weight of social norms (Galinsky et al., 2008). The implication is 
that those with high power will need to feel remorse for their behavior in order to compel 




 In an interpersonal context such as the one that I am examining, remorse involves 
the internal recognition that one has behaved badly and created negative ramifications for 
someone else.  One of the key theoretical arguments that I have made is that those with 
high power may not be aware that they have behaved in an offensive manner towards 
another person.  For one, the possession of power leads one to be more focused on goal 
pursuit and one’s own self-interest (Guinote, 2007).   In this context the psychological 
state of an aggrieved party may not be pertinent.  Indeed, social distance theory suggests 
that those with high power will show less interest in others’ mental state and will not be 
as responsive to others’ needs (Magee & Smith, 2013).  Supportive of this notion, high 
power has been linked to a lack of compassion for others (Van Kleef et al., 2008).  
The theory of moral hypocrisy is also supportive of the notion that high power 
individuals will experience less remorse following an offensive act.  Moral hypocrisy 
involves having a double standard concerning one’s view on immoral behavior, and has 
been linked to the possession of power (Rustichini & Villeval, 2014).  Moral hypocrisy 
provides a theoretical frame for understanding why a high power individual may feel 
justified in their behavior, even as a victim may feel that he/she deserves an apology.    
Across four experiments, Lammers et al. (2010) found that high power 
individuals, as opposed to low power individuals, judged their own moral improprieties 
less harshly than the improprieties of other people.  The implication is that those with 
high power will have more psychological freedom to behave badly since the 
psychological bar for their misbehavior is higher.  Building on this finding, I propose that 
high power individuals will also be less likely to feel remorseful about their behavior, 




Hypothesis 11: Individuals with high power will experience less remorse than 
individuals in the control group. 
Hypothesis 12: Individuals with high power will be less willing to apologize (vs. 
control). 
Hypothesis 13: Remorse will mediate the relationship between high power and 
willingness to apologize. 
Low Power and Remorse 
In contrast to those with high power, those with low power are expected to 
experience more remorse following an interpersonally offensive act.  This contention 
rests on the notion that those with low power engage in more perspective taking than 
those with high power (Galinsky et al., 2006).  Perspective taking is the process of 
imagining the thoughts and feelings of another person (Galinsky et al., 2006).  This is 
critical to my argument as perspective taking is related to correctly discerning the 
interests of others (Eisenberg, Murphy, & Shepard, 1997), which in turn should be tied to 
remorse.    
Remorse involves negative sentiment concerning the consequences of one’s 
behavior (Exline et al., 2007).  In this case I am studying the consequences of one’s 
offensive behavior towards another person.  It is more likely that one will appreciate the 
negative consequences of one’s interpersonal behavior when one understands the point of 
view of the victim: this is a consequence of perspective-taking.   As a result, the low 
power individual is more likely to recognize that this victim’s interests have been 




power will feel more remorse concerning their offensive behavior. 
Moreover, low power individuals will be acutely aware of the negative emotions 
that others harbor towards them.  This was demonstrated in a study by Anderson and 
Berdahl (2002) which found that those with low power overestimated an interaction 
partner’s threatening emotions, consisting of anger, contempt, and disgust.  I propose that 
this inclination should be related to heightened feelings of remorse.  Indeed, 
overestimating the victim’s negative emotions could result in low power individuals 
experiencing even more remorse than the initial offensive behavior would otherwise 
dictate.   
Hypothesis 14: Individuals with low power will experience more remorse than 
individuals in the control group. 
Hypothesis 15: Individuals with low power will be more willing to apologize (vs. 
control). 
Hypothesis 16: Remorse will mediate the relationship between low power and 
willingness to apologize. 
Low Status and Instrumentality Perceptions 
The instrumental perspective on apologizing suggests that offenders’ decision 
about whether to apologize is a function of whether offenders believe that they will be 
forgiven and thus trusted again (Leunissen et al., 2012).  Under this line of reasoning, 
offenders gauge the odds of whether the victim will accept their apology before 
delivering one: if offenders believe that their apology will be accepted, they should be 




involved actual behavior, both in terms of the offensive act and the apology (Leunissen et 
al., 2012).      
The underlying logic behind the instrumental perspective is that would-be 
apologizers seek positive outcomes and seek to avoid negative outcomes from an 
apology, and this motivates their apology behavior.  This is consistent with the notion 
that apologizers are strategic in deciding whether or not to issue apologies (Lazare, 2004; 
Leunissen et al., 2012).  The positive outcomes that apologizers seek are forgiveness, 
along with some form of reconciliation.  By contrast, apologizers seek to avoid the 
rejection associated with an unaccepted apology, which is often accompanied by 
humiliation and punishment (Exline et al., 2007).  Offenders thus gauge whether 
apologies will lead to outcomes that are in their best interest: when offenders do not 
believe that they will be forgiven, the apology will not be viewed instrumentally and 
hence not delivered (Leunissen et al., 2012). 
Those with low status, as I have previously argued, should be less confident that 
they will be forgiven for their misbehavior.  This is because they are not in good social 
standing with their peers, people who in the aggregate have less respect and admiration 
for them.  Victims typically forgive those with whom they want to reconcile and restore a 
positive relationship (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002).  However, those 
with low status recognize that their relationships are not strong.  They will thus have 
lowered expectations concerning their reception from social partners.  In short, those with 
low status have strong reason to believe that the victim will not desire reconciliation and 
will not accept their apology, since the social link is already weak.     




perceptions about apologies than individuals in the control group. 
Hypothesis 18: Individuals with low status will be less willing to apologize (vs. 
control). 
Hypothesis 19: Instrumentality perceptions will mediate the relationship between 
low status and willingness to apologize. 
High Status and Instrumentality Perceptions 
High status individuals, by contrast, have strong reason to believe that their 
apology will be accepted and that the relationship can be restored.  This derives from the 
underlying premise that high status individuals reap social benefits by virtue of the 
respect and admiration that others have for them (Blau, 1964; Hollander, 1958).  
Moreover, these benefits often exist in the mind of the high status individual, thus 
yielding more favorable social perceptions and a set of positive expectations concerning 
others’ evaluations of the self (Pettit & Sivanathan, 2012).   
For example, Lount and Pettit (2012) found that one of the byproducts of high 
status is the belief that another person will have benevolent intentions; benevolent 
intentions are the degree to which one wants to do good for another.   Pettit and 
Sivanathan (2012) provide further proof that status cues shape social perceptions: those 
with high status reported a higher percentage of seeing smiling faces and hearing 
applause following a public performance versus those with low status.   
The factors above drive my contention about the positive link between high status 
and instrumentality perceptions.  High status individuals exist in a world in which they 




Sivanathan, 2012).  Indeed, I propose that instrumentality perceptions are a natural 
extension of the Lount and Pettit (2012) study concerning benevolent intentions.  
Because high status individuals perceive that others generally want the best for them, 
they should expect that interaction partners will accept their apologies because of the 
benefits – trust restoration, forgiveness - that it would provide the high status holder.  
Thus, I propose that the high status individual is more likely than the individual in the 
control condition to believe that the victim will be accepting of their apology. 
Hypothesis 20:  Individuals with high status will have higher instrumentality 
perceptions about apologies than individuals in the control group. 
Hypothesis 21: Individuals with high status will be more willing to apologize (vs. 
control). 
Hypothesis 22: Instrumentality perceptions will mediate the relationship between 








In order to test the hypotheses concerning one’s willingness to apologize under 
conditions of high and low power, and high and low status, I employed an experimental 
methodology.   
In this experimental design I utilized a vignette that allowed me to control the 
nature of the offensive act and the form of the apology, and ultimately to determine 
causality. In addition, this design allowed me to distinguish the effects of power and 
status, which often co-vary in naturalized settings.  My design further enabled me to 
clearly differentiate the conditions of high power, low power, control power, high status, 
low status, and control status.   
I examined the apology process in a dyadic context. I did not manipulate the 
power or status of the victim, just that of the offender.  While some power/status studies 
consider these factors relationally, my goal was to isolate the psychological effect of 
power and status on the offending party.  In this way, I am making an assumption of 
homogeneity across victims. 
I also targeted participants with work experience as I consider them better able to 
relate to a scenario that involves workplace interactions.   
Method 
Participants and Design.  In this online study, I recruited and compensated 
participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online marketplace created by 
Amazon.com in which “workers” complete computerized tasks that are posted by 




samples are reliable (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014).  Further, MTurk workers have been 
found to be internally motivated and demographically diverse, particularly along the 
dimensions of industry and work experience (Behrend, Sharek, Meade, & Wiebe, 2011; 
Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). In the recruitment information, I requested that 
only individuals with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S. participate, 
and I limited the recruitment to the U.S. 
Participants were 441 individuals (54% male; 46% female) from the United States 
with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S.  Participants received $1.20 
to complete an approximately 10-minute survey.  The mean age was 35.2 (SD = 11.2), 
and the participants reported working 38.8 hours (SD = 10.0) per week on average.  
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 3 (status: high vs. low vs. 
control) x 3 (power: high vs. low vs. control) between-participants experimental design.  
All instructions and questions were constructed and delivered using Qualtrics, the survey 
software.   
Experimental Conditions.  Power and status were manipulated using primes 
adapted from Blader and Chen (2012), and Petit and Sivanathan (2012).  Participants 
assigned to the high status/control power and low status/control power condition(s) were 
instructed to imagine: 
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of (relatively little) 
status within this organization.  You have (do not have) the sense that your 
colleagues really like, respect, and admire you (particularly like, respect, or 




organization.  Note that this is separate from the level of power that you possess 
in the organization.   
In the high power/control status and low power/control status condition(s), participants 
were instructed to imagine: 
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of (relatively little) 
power within this organization.  Indeed you are one of the most (least) powerful 
individuals in the company.  You are personally given control over an unusually 
large (relatively meager) amount of resources, compared with your peers in other 
departments.  Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or admiration 
that others in the organization feel toward you.   
In the high status/high power, high status/low power, low status/high power, and low 
status/low power conditions, respectively, participants were given instructions that 
included both the power and status manipulations.  The status manipulation was always 
presented first, followed by the power manipulation.  For example, in the high status/high 
power condition, participants were instructed to imagine that: 
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of status within this 
organization.  You have the sense that your colleagues really like, respect, and 
admire you.  Indeed, you possess a great deal of esteem within the organization. 
In addition, you hold a great deal of power within this organization.  Indeed, you 
are one of the most powerful individuals in the company.  You are personally 
given control over an unusually large amount of resources, compared with your 




For the control condition, no such information concerning status or power was provided.  
Instead, participants were simply told: 
 You work at a pharmaceutical company.   
Procedure.  Following the manipulations, participants were presented with a short 
scenario, adapted from Hetrick et al., (2014), that represents an interpersonal offense 
from the perspective of an offender. The scenario is as follows: 
You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing 
the product pipeline for the company.  At one point in the meeting one of your 
colleagues begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant.  You interrupt the 
colleague and state that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in 
front of the rest of the group.   
After reading these prompts, participants completed the dependent measure, manipulation 
check, and demographic measures, in that order.   
 Demographic variables.  Participants were asked their gender, age, and hours 
worked on average per week.   
Manipulation Check.  Participants were asked two questions to serve as 
manipulation checks: “How much power do you have at the company?” and “How much 
status do you have at the company?”  Both questions were answered on a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1 (none at all) to 5 (a great deal). 
Dependent Variable. Participants were given the following definition of apology: 
“an explicit verbal or written statement of apologetic intent such as ‘I am sorry’ that you 




what happened during the meeting?”  The question was answered on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely).  
Results and Discussion  
Neither age (r = .06, p = .22), nor hours worked per week (r = -.04, p = .43), 
correlated with willingness to apologize.  A one-way ANOVA showed that gender had a 
significant effect on willingness to apologize, F(1, 439) = 8.9, p = .003.  Women (M = 
6.10, SD = 1.35) showed a greater willingness to apologize than did men (M = 5.66, SD 
= 1.64).  As a result, I included gender as a covariate in models testing willingness to 
apologize.  
I tested several assumptions before running tests of the hypotheses.  I computed 
and found Levene’s statistic to be significant, thus I do not have homogeneous variances.  
However, my group sample sizes are approximately equal; and SPSS uses a regression 
approach for ANOVA, meaning that ANOVA and multiple regression using dummy 
variables are mathematically the same, so the problem is less important (Leech, Barrett, 
& Morgan, 2015).  In addition, I compared box plots and confirmed that the dependent 
variable, willingness to apologize, is normally distributed.   
Manipulation Checks 
A one-way ANOVA showed that the power manipulation had a significant effect 
on how much power the participants felt they had at the company, F(2, 438) = 322, p < 
.001. Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the high-power condition (M = 4.42, 
SD = 0.98) reported a significantly greater sense of power than participants in the control 
condition (M = 2.84, SD = 0.90), t(296.6) = 14.49, p < .001, d = 1.57, and than 




.001, d = 2.52, confirming that the high power manipulation increased sense of power. 
Planned contrasts also revealed that the low-power condition participants reported a 
significantly lower sense of power than participants in the control condition, t(269.8) = -
10.50, p < .001, d = -.94, confirming that the manipulation of low power reduced sense of 
power compared to the control condition.  
A one-way ANOVA showed that the status manipulation had a significant effect 
on how much status they felt they had at the company, F(2, 437) = 91, p < .001. Planned 
contrasts revealed that participants in the high-status condition (M = 4.00, SD = 1.15) 
reported a significantly greater sense of status than participants in the control condition 
(M = 3.04, SD = 1.19), t(294.8) = 7.11, p < .001, d = .96 and than participants in the low-
status condition (M = 2.23, SD = 0.96), t(273.2) = 14.09, p < .001, d = 1.77, confirming 
the manipulation of high status.   Planned contrasts also revealed that the low-status 
condition participants reported a significantly lower sense of status than participants in 
the control condition, t(292) = -6.48, p < .001, d = -.81, confirming that my manipulation 
of low status reduced sense of status compared to the control condition. 
Willingness to Apologize 
To analyze the effect of the power and status on participants’ willingness to 
apologize, I conducted a 3x3 between-participants ANCOVA, with power (high vs. low 
vs. control) and status (high vs. low vs. control) as the factors, and gender as the 
covariate; see Table 1 for Estimated marginal means (EMM).    
This analysis revealed that gender was a significant covariate F(1, 431) = 9.72, p 




There was no main effect of power, F(2, 431) = .45, p = .641, np2 = .00, and there was 
not a significant power x status interaction, F(4, 431) = 1.186, p = .316, np2 = .01. 
High power participants (EMM = 5.78, SE = 0.12) were no less likely to 
apologize than those in the control condition (EMM = 5.83, SE = 0.12), F<1.  Low power 
(EMM = 5.95, SE = 0.13) and control conditions also did not differ, F<1.  Thus 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not supported.   
The high status (EMM = 6.02, SE = 0.13) and control conditions (EMM = 5.98, 
SE = 0.12) did not differ, F<1, therefore Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Nonetheless, 
those with high status were more willing to apologize than those with low status (EMM = 
5.56, SE = 0.13), t(284) = 2.548, p = .011, np2 = .02. 
In support of Hypothesis 4, participants experiencing low status (EMM = 5.56, SE 
= 0.13) were less willing to apologize compared to those in the control condition (EMM 
= 5.98, SE = 0.12), t(298) = -2.447, p = .015, np2 = .01.  
Hypothesis 5 predicted that individuals with high status will be more willing to 
apologize (vs. control), regardless of whether they have high power, low power, or 
control power, and was not supported. Planned comparisons revealed that participants 
with high status did not differ in willingness to apologize when they also had high power 
(EMM = 6.06, SE = 0.21) as compared to control (EMM = 5.95, SE = 0.22), t(96) = .391, 
p = .696, np2 = .00.  Similarly, participants with high status were no more willing to 
apologize when they had low power (EMM = 6.04, SE = 0.22) compared to the control 
(EMM = 6.26, SE = 0.20), t(101) = -.795, p = .427, np2 = .00.  Further, there was no 




manipulated (EMM = 5.96, SE = 0.22) vs. control (EMM = 5.73, SE = 0.21), t(98) = 
.737, p = .461, np2 = .00. The results are illustrated in Figure 1.  
Hypothesis 6 predicted that individuals with low status will be less willing to 
apologize (vs. control), regardless of whether they have high power, low power, or 
control power, and was partially supported. Planned comparisons revealed that 
participants with low status were less willing to apologize when they also had high power 
(EMM = 5.34, SE = 0.21) as compared to control (EMM = 5.95, SE = 0.22), t(99) = -
2.058, p = .041, np2 = .02.  Similarly, participants with low status were also less willing 
to apologize when they had low power (EMM = 5.54, SE = 0.25) compared to the control 
(EMM = 6.26, SE = 0.20), t(93) = -2.309, p = .022, np2 = .03.  However, there was no 
difference in low status participants’ willingness to apologize when power was not 
manipulated (EMM = 5.80, SE = 0.20) vs. control (EMM = 5.73, SE = 0.21), t(104) = 
.232, p = .817, np2 = .000.  
In sum, results from Study 1 provide evidence favoring my argument that status 
exerts a greater impact than power on the apology process.  I found a main effect for 
status, but not for power, and in the predicted direction.  Low status is related to a 
reduced willingness to apologize as compared to the control condition: this is true 
regardless of whether participants also possess high power or low power.  Moreover, high 
status individuals are more willing to apologize than those with low status.  I further 






In order to test the hypotheses concerning victims’ reactions to apologies from 
those with high power and high status, I once again used an experimental design that 
employed a vignette methodology.  My research objective was ultimately to gauge the 
impact of an apology on the influence process, which is why I focused solely on high 
power and high status. 
Method 
Participants and Design.  As with Study 1, I recruited and compensated 
participants via MTurk, the online marketplace for completing tasks.   In the recruitment 
information, I requested that only individuals with at least six months of prior work 
experience in the U.S. participate, and I limited the recruitment to the U.S. 
Participants were 196 individuals (54% male; 46% female) from the United States 
with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S.  Participants received $1.20 
to complete an approximately 10-minute survey.  The mean age was 35.4 (SD = 11.0), 
and the participants reported working 36.7 hours (SD = 11.0) per week on average.  
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (high status vs. high 
power) x 2 (apology vs. no apology) between-participants experimental design.  All 
instructions and questions were constructed and delivered using Qualtrics.   
Procedure.  Participants were presented with a short scenario, adapted from 
Hetrick et al., (2014), that represents an interpersonal offense.  Unlike Study 1, the 
scenario is from the perspective of the victim and not the offender.  The scenario that 




You work at a pharmaceutical company, and you are in a work meeting with a 
group of colleagues.  At one point in the meeting you begin to ask a question 
about the product pipeline.  At that point one of your colleagues interrupts you 
and states that the question that you have posed is “stupid” in front of the rest of 
the group. 
Power and status were manipulated using primes adapted from Blader and Chen 
(2012) and Petit and Sivanathan (2012).  Participants assigned to the high status condition 
were instructed to imagine: 
The person who interrupted you (“R”) has a great deal of status in your 
organization and is generally liked, respected, and admired by everyone in the 
organization. 
Participants assigned to the high power condition were instructed to imagine: 
R has a great deal of power in your organization and controls an unusually large 
amount of resources compared with others in the organization. 
Participants assigned to the apology condition were then instructed to imagine: 
The following day R apologized to you for the interruption and for being rude. R 
promised you that it would never happen again.  You believe that R’s apology 
was sincere.   
For the no apology condition, no such information concerning an apology from R was 
provided.   
 Demographic variables.  Participants were asked their gender, age, and hours 




Dependent Variables.  After being told about the apology or not, participants 
were asked about their perceptions of R. 
Perception of Warmth.  Participants were asked to “indicate the extent to which 
each of the following terms describes the person who interrupted you”, taken from 
Wiggins (1979) and Fragale et al. (2011):  cordial, respectful, cooperative, agreeable, 
impolite (r), disrespectful (r), uncooperative (r), and quarrelsome (r).  The questions were 
answered on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely inaccurate description) to 9 
(extremely accurate description).  
Perception of Dominance.  Participants were asked to “indicate the extent to 
which each of the following terms describes the person who interrupted you”, taken from 
Wiggins (1979) and Fragale et al. (2011):  assertive, forceful, self-assured, dominant, 
submissive (r), unassertive (r), and timid (r).  The questions were answered on a 9-point 
scale ranging from 1 (extremely inaccurate description) to 9 (extremely accurate 
description).  
Results  
I conducted principal axis factor analysis with varimax rotation to assess the 
underlying structure for the 15 items used to measure the perceptions of the offender.   
Two factors were requested based on the fact that the items were designed to index two 
constructs, warmth and dominance.  After rotation, the first factor accounted for 49.1% of 
the variance and the second factor accounted for 15.4% of the variance.  Table 2 displays 
the items and factor loadings for the rotated factors, with loadings less than .40 omitted to 
improve clarity.  As expected, the first factor appears to index to warmth, while the 




reliability for the two dependent variables, warmth and dominance: the alpha for warmth 
was .940; the alpha for dominance was .853.  Thus, both variables demonstrated good 
internal consistency (Leech et al., 2015).   
Gender (r = -.012, p = .86), age (r = -.112, p = .12), and hours worked per week (r 
= -.126, p = .08) were not correlated with warmth perceptions.  Gender (r = .052, p = .47) 
and hours worked per week (r = .063, p = .38) were not correlated with dominance 
perceptions; however, age was correlated with dominance perceptions (r = .239, p = 
.001).  Because the correlation between age and dominance perceptions was significant, 
and because the correlation between age and warmth perceptions approached 
significance, I included age as a covariate in models testing warmth and dominance.  
 I tested several assumptions before running tests of the hypotheses.  I tested the 
assumption of homogeneity of variances by computing the Levene statistic: the test was 
not significant; thus the homogeneity of variances assumption is not violated.  In 
addition, because the samples for my groups are approximately equal, the Box test can be 
ignored and Pillai's trace used for the Multivariate statistic (Leech et al., 2015).   
I conducted a two factor MANCOVA to assess whether victims perceive high 
status vs. high power offenders who apologize versus those who don’t apologize as 
warmer or more dominant, with age of the victim as a covariate; see Tables 2 and 3 for 
Estimated marginal means (EMM).   MANCOVA works best when the two dependent 
variables are negatively correlated, as they are in my study (r = -.513, p <.001), (Leech et 
al., 2015).   
This analysis revealed that age was a significant covariate, Pillai’s Trace = .049, 




Pillai’s Trace = .291, F(2, 190) = 38.930, p<.001, multivariate η2= .291.  There was no 
main effect of context (high power/high status), Pillai’s Trace = .004, F(2, 190) = .366, 
p=.694, multivariate η2= .004, and there was not a significant apology x context 
interaction, Pillai’s Trace = .002, F(2, 190) = .186, p=.831, multivariate η2= .002. 
Follow up univariate analyses are presented in Table 5.  Age was a significant 
covariate for dominance (p =.002), but not warmth (p=.161).  The main effect of an 
apology versus no apology was significant for warmth (p <.001), but not dominance (p = 
.062). Victims perceived those who apologized as warmer but no more or less dominant 
that those who did not apologize.  There was no difference between high status and high 
power for warmth (p = .460) or dominance (p = .454).  Thus, Hypotheses 7 and 8 were 







Studies 3a and 3b 
In Study 1 found evidence that there is an effect of status, but not power, on 
willingness to apologize.  It is thus worth exploring the underlying psychology of status 
and power to add additional insight into why these contextual factors differ relative to 
one’s willingness to apologize.  In order to test the hypotheses concerning the mediating 
mechanisms underlying power, status, and the willingness to apologize, I once again 
employed an experimental design involving a vignette methodology.   
In Study 3a, I manipulated power and examined whether remorse mediates the 
relationship between power and the willingness to apologize.  In Study 3b, I manipulated 
status and examined whether instrumentality perceptions mediate the relationship 




Participants and Design.  As with Studies 1 and 2, I recruited and compensated 
participants via MTurk, the online marketplace for completing tasks.   In the recruitment 
information, I requested that only individuals with at least six months of prior work 
experience in the U.S. participate, and I limited the recruitment to the U.S. 
Participants were 148 individuals (55% male; 45% female) from the United States 
with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S.  Participants received $1.20 
to complete an approximately 10-minute survey.  The mean age was 34.3 (SD = 10.4), 




 Participants were randomly assigned to a high power, low power, or control 
condition.  All instructions and questions were constructed and delivered using Qualtrics. 
Experimental Conditions.  Like Study 1, power was manipulated using primes 
adapted from Blader and Chen (2012) and Petit and Sivanathan (2012).  Participants 
assigned to the high power condition were instructed to imagine: 
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of power within this 
organization.  Indeed you are one of the most powerful individuals in the 
company.  You are personally given control over an unusually large amount of 
resources, compared with your peers in other departments.  Note that this is 
separate from the amount of respect or admiration that others in the organization 
feel toward you.   
Participants assigned to the low power condition were instructed to imagine: 
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little power within 
this organization.  Indeed you are one of the least powerful individuals in the 
company.  You are personally given control over a relatively meager amount of 
resources, compared with your peers in other departments.  Note that this is 
separate from the amount of respect or admiration that others in the organization 
feel toward you.   
For the control condition, no such information concerning power was provided to the 
participants.  Instead participants were simply told that they: 




Procedure.  Following the manipulations, participants were presented with a short 
scenario, adapted from Hetrick et al., (2014), that represents an interpersonal offense 
from the perspective of an offender. The scenario is as follows: 
You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing 
the product pipeline for the company.  At one point in the meeting one of your 
colleagues begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant.  You interrupt the 
colleague and state that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in 
front of the rest of the group.   
After reading these prompts, participants completed the dependent measure, manipulation 
check, and demographic measures, in that order.   
 Demographic variables.  Participants were asked their gender, age, and hours 
worked on average per week.   
Manipulation Check.  Participants were asked one question to serve as a 
manipulation check: “How much power do you have at the company?”  The question was 
answered on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (none at all) to 5 (a great deal). 
Remorse.  Remorse was measured with three items adapted from Exline et al. 
(2007); the three items were averaged to assess remorse (α = .91) in that study.  The 
items are: “How much regret do you have about what happened during the meeting?”; 
“How much guilt or remorse do you have about what happened during the meeting?”; 
and “How committed are you to not behaving in that way again?”  The questions were 






Dependent Variable. Participants were given the following definition of an 
apology: “an explicit verbal or written statement of apologetic intent such as ‘I am sorry’ 
that you believe is sincere” and asked “How likely are you to apologize to your colleague 
about what happened during the meeting?”  The question was answered on a 7-point 
scale ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely).  
Results and Discussion 
I computed Cronbach’s alpha to test for reliability for the variable remorse: the 
alpha was .918, thus demonstrating good internal consistency (Leech et al., 2015).  
Remorse was correlated with willingness to apologize (r = .754, p < .001).   
A one-way ANOVA showed that gender did not have a significant effect on 
remorse, F(1, 148) = 1.90, p = .171, or on willingness to apologize, F(1, 148) = 2.5, p = 
.118.  Hours worked per week was not correlated with remorse, (r = .05, p = .557) or with 
willingness to apologize, (r = -.01, p = .895).  However, age was correlated with remorse, 
(r = .18, p = .029), and with willingness to apologize (r = .26, p = .002). As a result, I 
included age as a covariate in models testing remorse and willingness to apologize.  
Manipulation Check 
A one-way ANOVA showed that the power manipulation had a significant effect 
on how much power the participants felt they had at the company, F(2, 147) = 81, p < 
.001. Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the high-power condition (M = 4.34, 
SD = 1.10) reported a significantly greater sense of power than participants in the control 
condition (M = 2.89, SD = 0.69), t(81.4) = 7.99, p < .001, d = 1.45 and than participants 
in the low-power condition (M = 2.04, SD = .87), t(91.9) = 11.4, p < .001, d = 2.30, 




that the low-power condition participants reported a significantly lower sense of power 
than participants in the control condition, t(85.6) = -5.3, p < .001, d = -..85, confirming 
that my manipulation of low power reduced sense of power compared to the control 
condition.  
Remorse 
A one-way ANCOVA, with power as the factor and age as the covariate, showed 
that power did not have a significant effect on remorse, F(2, 144) = 1.599, p = .206.   
Hypothesis 11 predicted that individuals with high power will experience less 
remorse than individuals in the control group, and was not supported. Planned 
comparisons revealed that there was no difference in remorse between high power 
participants (EMM = 4.13, SE = .14) and control participants (EMM = 3.90, SE = .14, 
t(102) = 1.15, p =.254, d = .23.   
Hypothesis 14 predicted that individuals with low power will experience more 
remorse than individuals in the control group and was not supported. Planned 
comparisons revealed that there was no difference in remorse between low power 
participants  (EMM = 4.25, SE = .15) and control participants (EMM = 3.90, SE = .14), 
t(98) = 1.752, p =.082, d = .35.   
Further, there was no difference in remorse between high power participants and 
low power participants, t(93) = -.600, p =.550, d = -.12.   
Willingness to Apologize 
A one-way ANCOVA, with power as the factor and age as the covariate, showed 
that power did not have a significant effect on willingness to apologize, F(2, 144) = .052, 




Hypothesis 12 predicted that individuals with high power will be less willing to 
apologize than those in the control group, and was not supported. Planned comparisons 
revealed that there was no difference in willingness to apologize between high power 
participants (EMM = 6.17, SE = .17) and control participants (EMM = 6.20, SE = .16), 
t(102) = -.134, p =.893, d = -.03.   
Hypothesis 15 predicted that individuals with low power will be more willing to 
apologize than those in the control group, and was not supported.  Planned comparisons 
revealed that there was no difference in willingness to apologize between low power 
participants (EMM = 6.25, SE = .17) and control participants (EMM = 6.20, SE = .16), 
t(98) = .196, p =.845, d = .05.   
 Further, there was no difference in willingness to apologize between high power 
participants and low power participants, t(93) = -.322, p =.748, d = -.08.   
 Mediation  
I used Hayes and Preacher’s (2014) approach to mediation analysis with a 
multicategorical independent variable. The model, parameter estimates, and model fit 
statistics provide the information about how k groups differ from each other; and the 
approach enables simultaneous hypothesis tests (Hayes & Preacher, 2014).   Further, with 
the bootstrapping approach to mediation, one does not need to find evidence of a direct 
effect in order to test for and find mediation (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004).   
I dummy (or indicator) coded the groups, following the system outlined by Hayes 
and Preacher. I coded the control power condition as 1, low power condition as 2, and 
high power condition as 3, as per Hayes and Preacher recommendation, with the control 




model, I found estimated model coefficients, I derived group means, and I determined 
standardized mean differences similar to Cohen’s d.  
To test the hypotheses that power influences willingness to apologize through 
remorse, I used bootstrapping mediation analysis, with age as a covariate, using the SPSS 
PROCESS macro (Hayes & Preacher, 2014) (bias-corrected, 5,000 resamples).  I found 
no evidence of mediation (Omnibus 95% confidence interval = -.0115 to .0562; see Fig. 4 
for the path coefficients for low power and high power).  Thus Hypothesis 13 and 
Hypothesis 16, which predicted that remorse would mediate the relationship between 
high and low power, respectively, and willingness to apologize, were not supported.   
In sum, in Study 3a I found no direct effect of power on willingness to apologize, 
which is consistent with Study 1 and contrary to my theorizing.  Further, I did not find an 
indirect effect of power on willingness to apologize through the mediating mechanism of 








Participants and Design.  As with Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3a, I recruited and 
compensated participants via MTurk, the online marketplace for completing tasks.   In 
the recruitment information, I requested that only individuals with at least six months of 
prior work experience in the U.S. participate, and I limited the recruitment to the U.S. 
Participants were 148 individuals (51% male; 49% female) from the United States 
with at least six months of prior work experience in the U.S.  Participants received $1.20 
to complete an approximately 10-minute survey.  The mean age was 35.3 (SD = 10.5), 
and the participants reported working 38.2 hours (SD = 10.5) per week on average.  
 Participants were randomly assigned to a high status, low status, or control 
condition.  All instructions and questions were constructed and delivered using Qualtrics. 
Experimental Conditions.  Like Study 1, status was manipulated using primes 
adapted from Blader and Chen (2012) and Petit and Sivanathan (2012).  Participants 
assigned to the high status condition were instructed to imagine: 
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of status within this 
organization.  You have the sense that your colleagues really like, respect, and 
admire you.  Indeed, you possess a great deal of esteem within the organization.  
Note that this is separate from the level of power that you possess in the 
organization.   
Participants assigned to the low status condition were instructed to imagine: 
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little status within this 




admire you.  Indeed, you possess little esteem within the organization.  Note that 
this is separate from the level of power that you possess in the organization.   
For the control condition, no such information concerning status was provided to the 
participants.  Instead participants were simply told that they: 
 Work at a pharmaceutical company.   
Procedure.  Following the manipulations, participants were presented with a short 
scenario, adapted from Hetrick et al., (2014), that represents an interpersonal offense 
from the perspective of an offender. The scenario is as follows: 
You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing 
the product pipeline for the company.  At one point in the meeting one of your 
colleagues begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant.  You interrupt the 
colleague and state that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in 
front of the rest of the group.   
After reading these prompts, participants completed the dependent measure, manipulation 
check, and demographic measures, in that order.   
 Demographic variables.  Participants were asked their gender, age, and hours 
worked on average per week.   
Manipulation Check.  Participants were asked one question to serve as a 
manipulation check: “How much status do you have at the company?”  The question was 
answered on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (none at all) to 5 (a great deal). 
Instrumentality Perceptions.  Instrumentality perceptions were measured with 
three items adapted from Leunissen et al. (2012); the three items were averaged to assess 




you think an apology is important for your colleague?”; “How effective do you think an 
apology will be to restore your relationship with your colleague?”; and “To what extent 
do you think an apology will repair the damaged trust between you and your colleague?”. 
The questions were answered on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much so).  
Dependent Variable. Participants were given the following definition of an 
apology: “an explicit verbal or written statement of apologetic intent such as ‘I am sorry’ 
that you believe is sincere” and asked “How likely are you to apologize to your colleague 
about what happened during the meeting?”  The question was answered on a 7-point 
scale ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely).  
Results and Discussion 
I computed Cronbach’s alpha to test for reliability for the variable instrumentality 
perceptions: the alpha was .530.  Neither the validity nor the reliability of the scale were 
improved by excluding any single item.   
Instrumentality perceptions were correlated with willingness to apologize (r = 
.329, p < .001) 
Hours worked per week was not correlated with instrumentality perceptions, (r = 
.10, p = .221) or with willingness to apologize, (r = -.10, p = .222).  Age was not 
correlated with instrumentality perceptions, (r = -.11, p = .182), or with willingness to 
apologize (r = .13, p = .107).  
A one-way ANOVA showed that gender did not have a significant effect on 
instrumentality perceptions, F(1, 146) = .163, p = .687.  However, gender did have a 




6.43, SD = .99) showed a greater willingness to apologize than did men (M = 5.83, SD = 
1.27).  As a result, I included gender as a covariate in models testing willingness to 
apologize.  
Manipulation Check 
A one-way ANOVA showed that the status manipulation had a significant effect 
on how much status the participants felt they had at the company, F(2, 145) = 41.1, p < 
.001. Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the high-status condition (M = 4.15, 
SD = 1.03) reported a significantly greater sense of status than participants in the control 
condition (M = 3.18, SD = .91), t(99.8) = 5.01, p < .001, d = .97 and than participants in 
the low-status condition (M = 2.37, SD = 1.00), t(95.8) = 8.75, p < .001, d = 1.78, 
confirming that high status increased sense of status.   Planned contrasts also revealed 
that the low-status condition participants reported a significantly lower sense of status 
than participants in the control condition, t(90.7) = -4.16, p < .001, d = -.81, confirming 
that my manipulation of low status reduced sense of status compared to the control 
condition. 
Instrumentality Perceptions 
A one-way ANOVA showed that status had a significant effect on instrumentality 
perceptions, F(2, 145) = 5.892, p =.003.   
Hypothesis 17 predicted that individuals with low status will have lower 
instrumentality perceptions about apologies than individuals in the control group, and 
was supported.  Planned comparisons revealed that the difference in instrumentality 
perceptions between low status participants (M = 2.96, SD = .72) and control participants 




Hypothesis 20 predicted that individuals with high status will have higher 
instrumentality perceptions about apologies than individuals in the control group, and 
was not supported.  Planned comparisons revealed that there was no difference in 
instrumentality perceptions between high status participants (M = 3.46, SD = .77) and 
control participants (M = 3.29, SD = .67), t(99.7) = .1.211, p = .228, d = .17.   
Further, the difference in instrumentality perceptions between high status 
participants and low status participants was significant, t(96.4) = 3.315, p < .001, d = .50.   
Willingness to Apologize 
A one-way ANCOVA, with status as the factor and gender as the covariate, 
showed that status had a significant effect on willingness to apologize, F(2,144) = 3.273, 
p =.041.   
Hypothesis 18 predicted that individuals with low status will be less willing to 
apologize than those in the control group, and was supported.  Planned comparisons 
revealed that the difference in willingness to apologize between low status participants 
(EMM = 5.77, SE = .17) and control participants (EMM = 6.28, SE = .16) was 
significant, t(94) = -2.213, p = .028, d =-.51.   
Hypothesis 21 predicted that individuals with high status will be more willing to 
apologize than those in the control group, and was not supported.  Planned comparisons 
revealed that the difference in willingness to apologize between high status participants 
(EMM = 6.28, SE = .15) and control participants (EMM = 6.28, SE = .16) was not 
significant, t(101) = .001, p = .999, d = .00.  
Further, the difference in willingness to apologize between high status 





Like Study 3a, I used Hayes and Preacher’s (2014) approach to mediation 
analysis with a multicategorical independent variable.  I indicator coded the control status 
condition as 1, low status condition as 2, and high status condition as 3, with the control 
condition as the reference group. 
To test the hypotheses that status influences willingness to apologize through 
instrumentality perceptions, I used bootstrapping mediation analysis, with gender as a 
covariate, using the SPSS PROCESS macro (Hayes & Preacher, 2014) (bias-corrected, 
5,000 resamples). This analysis confirmed mediation (Omnibus 95% confidence interval 
= .0014 to .0900; see Fig. 5 for the path coefficients for low status and high status); low 
status indirectly affected willingness to apologize through lower instrumentality 
perceptions.  
Thus Hypothesis 19, which predicted that instrumentality perceptions would 
mediate the relationship between low status and willingness to apologize, was supported; 
and Hypothesis 22, which predicted that instrumentality perceptions would mediate 
relationship between high status and willingness to apologize, was not supported. 
In sum, in Study 3b I found a direct effect of status on willingness to apologize, 
which is consistent with Study 1 and with my theorizing.  Further, I found an indirect 
effect of low status on willingness to apologize through the mediating mechanism of 
instrumentality perceptions. This finding is also consistent with my theorizing.  By 
contrast, I found no evidence of a mediating mechanism concerning high status and 






Chapter 8: General Discussion  
In this dissertation, I studied how power and status impact the apology process, 
both as predictors of the willingness to apologize, and as factors shaping victim 
perceptions of offenders in the aftermath of an apology.   
First, in both Study 1 and Study 3b I found that those with low status were less 
willing to apologize than those with high status and than those in the control condition. 
However, I did not find a difference based on power on willingness to apologize.  These 
findings add to our understanding of the psychology of both status and power, 
particularly as it relates to how these factors differ.  Indeed, it appears that one’s status, 
and not one’s power, influences whether one is willing to apologize after committing an 
interpersonal offense. In addition, I explored two underlying psychological mechanisms 
that have been shown to play a role in the apology process, remorse and instrumentality 
perceptions.  I determined that for those with low status, instrumentality perceptions 
influence one’s willingness to apologize.   
Further, I explored the impact that interpersonal apologies from high power and 
high status individuals have on victims’ perceptions of the offender.  I focused on high 
power and high status in particular because these social factors are commonly believed to 
be apology deterrents, due to the supposed negative ramifications of an apology.  In this 
vein, I proposed and found that there are positive social implications for high power and 
high status apologizers. More specifically, I found that both high status and high power 
offenders who apologize – relative to those who don’t – are seen as warmer and no less 




There are several important theoretical and practical implications from these 
findings.  Scholars have primarily focused on the components of an effective apology; by 
contrast there is relatively little research concerning contextual antecedents of apologies 
(Exline et al., 2007).  This is consistent with the broader notion that research on 
relationship repair after conflict has often yielded contradictory findings concerning 
repair strategies, including apologies (Ren & Gray, 2009).   
Further, due to the ubiquitous nature of power and status dynamics in social 
settings, it is important for researchers to include these factors in our understanding of the 
apology process. Scholars have begun to parse out the separate psychological effects of 
power and status (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).  This dissertation is the first time to my 
knowledge that power and status – as defined herein – have been empirically contrasted 
relative to the apology process.  My findings shed light on an important difference 
between power and status relative to the apology process.  This represents a contribution 
to the power, status, and apology literatures.   
Blader and Chen (2012) contend that there is a gap in the literature concerning 
how power and status holders interact with others.  These researchers focused on the 
degree of fairness that power and status holders exhibit towards others.  My work on 
willingness to apologize provides additional insight into how power and status shape 
interpersonal dynamics.  Moreover, since status has been studied less extensively than 
has power, my findings concerning status and apologies are particularly impactful to the 
status literature.   
One crucial distinction between power and status is that power, as I have defined 




(Magee & Galinsky, 2008).  Building on these definitions, I argue that the expectations – 
or lack thereof - of others serves to either stimulate or stifle an apology.  This may help to 
explain why I found an effect for status, and not for power.  What’s more, the finding that 
low status individuals are less willing to apologize is consistent with the idea that the fear 
of rejection is a big impediment to apologizing (Tavuchis, 1991).  
It is important to note that power can also be viewed in a strictly relational sense, 
which means that an actor may exert his/her power depending on the presence of 
different counterparties.  I did not explore this dynamic in my study, and perhaps this 
provides an explanation as to why I did not find an effect for power.  In addition, those 
with high power tend to be more effective at goal pursuit, and an apology may be viewed 
as an effective tool to achieve social goals.  This dynamic may have outweighed the 
impediments to apologizing. 
With respect to the outcome of apologies, my research adds to the apology 
literature by linking apologies to perceptions of warmth and dominance.  Much of the 
research on the aftermath of apologies pertains to relationship repair, focusing on 
constructs such as trust and forgiveness.  By contrast, I demonstrate that apologies do not 
harm fundamental social perceptions that victims possess about high power and high 
status offenders.  Prior apology studies that did focus on perceptions were concerned with 
more generalized positive and negative impressions, and thus my findings add 
complexity to our understanding of the aftermath of apologies.  My results can also be 
seen as in line with prior research that showed that victims look more favorably on 




offender’s integrity.  This is because my focus was on one brief, negative interaction that 
was not overly severe in nature and not necessarily indicative of one’s character.  
My research also extends our understanding of the influence process, and 
represents a novel application of the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  While power and 
status have already been linked with perceptions of warmth and dominance (Fragale et 
al., 2011), we have a limited understanding of how these perceptions change following 
events like offensive acts and apologies.  This research helps to build a more fluid picture 
of how we perceive those with high power and high status by showing how apologies can 
shape our perceptions of them.   
 From a practical standpoint, a deeper understanding of how power and status 
impact the apology process is applicable to many social contexts, particularly within 
organizations.  Power and status are ubiquitous factors in organizations.  Individuals in 
organizations may transgress or act in offensive ways for a host of reasons, not the least 
of which is stress induced by excessive job demands, role conflict, work-life balance 
issues, and other pressures.  Moreover, leaders and others in organizations may 
experience relationship conflict with their colleagues, which has deleterious effects on 
team performance (de Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2012).  Leader trust-repair strategies such as 
apologies are thus critical, not only because leaders transgress, but also because leader 
transgressions are often either unintentional or beyond leaders’ control (Shapiro, Boss, 
Salas, Tangirala, & Von Glinow, 2011).   
In short, there is an important role for interpersonal apologies by leaders and 
others at various levels of the organizational hierarchy, which is why we must understand 




and so it especially important to determine who among us is likely to be most resistant to 
the act.  By demonstrating that low status individuals are less likely to apologize, these 
individuals can potentially adjust their thinking and behavior.  This would seem 
especially important for low status individuals who are already lacking in social capital 
within an organization, a deterrent to career success (Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001).  
Indeed, low status individuals would seem to be the group that has the most to gain by 
apologizing, which makes it unfortunate that they would be less willing to do so.  To 
address this, organizations might become more effective in designing targeted 
interventions such as apology trainings.   
 Further, results from my study allow us to draw the conclusion that status is a 
more important factor than power in determining who is willing to apologize.  This is 
important as it allows individuals and organizations to hone in on the presence or absence 
of status, rather than power, as a key clue in devising apology strategies related to 
conflict resolution.  My results may be seen as an additional negative factor related to low 
status, but one that can be potentially remedied through training and ultimately 
behavioral modification.  
 The other significant practical implication from this study derives from the 
finding that for those with high power and high status, interpersonal apologies are 
beneficial acts in terms of retaining influence.  It is important to note that this may be in 
contrast to favorable leadership behavior in a more public context.  Indeed, organizational 
leaders may look at the benefit that public figures, such as politicians, derive from not 
apologizing and determine that it is also in their best interests not to apologize.  However, 




apologizing.  This is because an apology will not only soothe the victim, but also enhance 
the perception of one’s warmth, with no diminishment to the perception of one’s 
dominance. This likely results in the offender gaining more interpersonal influence 
following the apology, versus no apology.  As such, my study shows that high status and 
high power offenders have a compelling reason to apologize should the circumstances 
dictate, perhaps making this simple act more likely to occur in practice.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
My conclusions should be considered in light of some limitations.  First, the scope 
of my studies was quite narrow.  I examined a small part of a large and complex 
phenomenon, the apology process.  My boundary conditions restrict my inquiry such that 
I do not account for a host of factors that might affect power- and status-holders’ 
willingness to apologize in the real world.  For example, I do not take into account social 
factors such as national culture, or the culture of the theoretical organization in question, 
nor do I account for relevant group norms.  I also do not account for important 
individual-level factors such as cognition, personality, and ethics, among others.   In 
short, I excluded many factors that should be included in a more expansive and 
explanatory apology model.   
The constructs that I have selected for this dissertation, as well as the definitions 
of these constructs, limit the generalizability of my findings.  Scholars have defined 
power and status in a variety of ways over time and across disciplines.  The differences 
between these various definitions and the definitions that I have selected in this 




For one, my definition of power focuses on control over external resources.  My 
theoretical model would differ if my conceptualization of power incorporated intrinsic, 
internalized sources.  For example, one’s knowledge or expertise gives one power in 
various contexts, particularly in the workplace (French & Raven, 1959).  Conversely, to 
the extent that one is lacking expertise, one becomes highly dependent on other 
individuals.  Similarly, I do not account for one’s charisma or referent power that can be 
exerted in various contexts, regardless of external forces (French & Raven, 1959).   Like 
power that is derived externally, internalized power might drive one’s willingness to 
apologize.  Indeed, these internalized power dynamics may supersede the dynamics 
rooted in external sources, depending on the context.  As a result, in this dissertation I 
may be understating the true role of power in the apology process.  The internalized 
conception of power should thus be included in future work that links power to 
willingness to apologize.  
Regarding status, I have defined this construct in terms of the prestige, respect, 
admiration, and esteem that others hold for an individual.  However, like power, 
definitions of status have varied over time and across studies (Piazza & Castellucci, 
2014).   Indeed, some scholars see status as originating from a social ranking, driven in 
part by intrinsic factors including one’s personality or physical attractiveness, and 
determined by the consensus of the group (e.g., Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001).  
One’s social ranking may also be driven by one’s place in a formal hierarchy.  Regardless 
of the source, an assessment of one’s social worth would be antecedent to status as I have 
defined it.  That is, prestige and respect would flow from this alternative notion of status.  




willingness to apologize: for example, the saliency and uniformity of the ranking, and the 
competitiveness of the environment.  Thus, one step for future research would be to 
include an assessment of an offender’s social ranking in the theoretical model linking 
status and willingness to apologize. 
I omit at least two other aspects of status from my studies that have implications 
for my conclusions.  First, I do not account for the specific social group that one places 
oneself at any given time.  One may feel high or low status generally, but this may vary 
from moment to moment as one moves through various social circles.  The fluid nature of 
status and its impact on the apology process should be explored more fully by scholars.  
Second, I do not account for the level of respect and admiration that the offender has for 
the victim.  This assessment of the victim’s status by the offender is separate from, but 
may be impacted by, the status level of the offender.   These are critical features of status 
in the real world that constrain my conclusions about one’s willingness to apologize in a 
given context.   
Beyond my definitions of power and status, two other key features of my studies 
limit the generalizability of my findings.  First, the hypothetical offense that I used in the 
experiments cannot represent the large range of offenses that occur in the real world.  
Second, my experiments involve a simple, basic, and sincere apology that does not 
represent the multiple forms of apologies that offenders can make, or that victims desire.   
In addition, my priming manipulations of status and power, and my use of 
vignettes, represent significant threats to external validity.  The primary benefit of using 
vignettes and primes is to eliminate confounds and to establish causality.  However, there 




The primes create a psychological state of power and status for participants, but the 
sensation is by definition finite and bounded, and the scenario as a whole is fleeting.  The 
experience of reading a prime simply cannot equate to the real-world experience of 
possessing power or status.  This may explain why my effect sizes are relatively small, 
which in turn restricts the breadth and depth of my practical implications.  That is, with a 
relatively small effect size, it is hard to gauge just how meaningful power and status are 
in the overall apology process. 
In practice, however, one’s sense of power and status is more deeply ingrained, 
and thus more impactful.  As a result, I would expect the psychological effect of status 
and power on willingness to apologize to be even stronger in a natural environment, 
particularly if there are environmental cues that trigger one’s sense of power/status.  For 
example, if one participates in a series of meetings, an activity not uncommon in the 
workplace, one’s sense of status should be primed.  Similarly, if one is in a position to 
make – or is subject to – budgetary or staffing decisions, power should also be primed.  
The psychological impact of these, and many other, real-world primes should be far 
greater than the primes in my experiment.  Indeed, a stronger sense of power in reality 
may influence the apology process in ways that I did not find.  This is a research question 
that should be explored. 
My findings might also be impacted by the specific nature of my experimental 
procedure.  First I separated the priming language from the vignette that outlines the 
offense.  This creates a momentary gap in the mind of the participant that might lessen 
the psychological impact of the prime and the link to willingness to apologize.  In 




this might artificially increase the impact of status versus power.  However, this only 
applies to Study 1; in Study 3, I replicate my findings from Study 1, while separately 
testing power and status.   
 In a more general sense, notwithstanding results from these lab studies, it is 
difficult to make predictions about the antecedents and outcomes of apologies given the 
complexity of human relationships.  In a naturalized setting, there is likely to be some 
type of historical relationship between the two parties, something that my studies do not 
take into account. The existence of any sort of pre-existing attitudes and feelings held by 
the respective parties would affect the apology process, both in terms of the antecedents 
to the apology, and the aftermath of the apology.  Nonetheless, for my purposes it was 
more important to isolate the effects of power and status, and in order to accomplish this 
goal the best option was an experiment.   
Moreover, I conducted the experiments using online workers who were paid small 
amounts for their participation, and thus there is a question as to how representative this 
sample is in terms of the wider workplace population.  Nonetheless, the pool of available 
workers on MTuck is large and diverse, and self-reports from MTurk workers indicate 
that they are motivated by both intrinsic and extrinsic factors (Paolacci & Chandler, 
2014).  In addition, I am asking participants to engage in psychological processes that are 
not exclusive to workplace settings.  
In terms of future directions, as I previously discussed, researchers should 
develop a more comprehensive model of the apology process, inclusive of additional 
definitions of power and status.  Scholars should test these hypotheses - both in terms of 




settings.  This may result in larger effect sizes.  Nonetheless, because this is a relatively 
new area of inquiry, it is important to conduct additional laboratory experiments first 
before conducting field research.  They key challenge in conducting research in the field 
will be to determine a way to separate the effects of power and status using a non-
experimental methodology.   
Apology researchers should take into account a range of power and status 
differences between the offender and the victim.  These differences might drive different 
levels of instrumentality perceptions, a key psychological mechanism in the apology 
process, as I discovered.  Moreover, researchers should seek to uncover mechanisms 
beyond instrumentality perceptions to help explain the relationship between status and 
willingness to apologize.  For example, researchers might consider remorse as a mediator 
for status; I considered remorse as a mediator for power, but not for status.  As I have 
argued, high status orients individuals outward toward social entities.  Thus, high status 
individuals are expected to be more cognizant of the negative reactions of victims, and 
ultimately should experience more remorse for their actions.  Conversely, low status 
individuals should be less concerned with the attitudes and feelings of others, and thus 
less remorseful.  This might help explain the relationship between low status and a 
reduced willingness to apologize that I found. 
In addition, a number of discrete emotions should be tested as mediators.  I 
suspect that emotions such as sadness and fear play a critical role in shaping status- and 
power-holders’ willingness to apologize.   This should be especially true is a real-world 
context.  Perhaps mechanisms other than instrumentality perceptions would be more 




Further, there are any number of moderating variables that might amplify the 
effect of power and status on the apology process, including the personality of both the 
offender and the victim.  In addition, researchers should study actual apology behavior as 
opposed to the willingness to apologize.  With respect to the impact of apologies on 
influence, researchers might study an actual demonstration of influence rather than 
perceptions of warmth and dominance, factors that indirectly gauge influence.  
Researchers should also study the impact of apologies from low power and low status 
individuals. 
Conclusion 
Apologies are tools employed to resolve conflict and rectify offenses.  The study 
of apologies has garnered significant interest in both scholarly and popular outlets.  
Scholars generally agree that apologies - particularly those in an interpersonal context - 
are an effective means of repairing damaged relationships.  Apologies would thus seem to 
have an important role to play in organizational settings, notably within leader-
subordinate dyads.  Nonetheless, apologies have yet to be thoroughly examined in this 
context, which is consistent with the notion that most apology studies consider apologies 
without a consideration of power or status (Barling et al., 2008).  My dissertation 
addresses this research gap.   
Power and status should play a role in the apology process (Tavuchis, 1991).  
Indeed, scholars have argued that the powerful are hesitant to apologize (Brown & 
Levinson, 1978; Lazare, 2004).  However, empirical support for this contention is 




to apologize.  What’s more, prior studies have conflated power and status, such that it is 
unclear precisely how the individual factors influence the apology process.    
In this dissertation, I demonstrate that power, as defined herein, does not have a 
significant effect on one’s willingness to apologize.  By contrast, I demonstrate that status 
does have a significant effect on one’s willingness to apologize.  More specifically, I find 
that low status makes one less willing to apologize. Further, I find that instrumentality 
perceptions mediate the relationship between status and willingness to apologize.  These 
findings have several important theoretical and practical implications relative to the 
apology process, as well as to the power and status literatures. 
In addition, I find that following an apology from either a high power or high 
status individual, perceptions of the apologizer’s warmth improves, while perceptions of 
the apologizer’s dominance are unchanged.  These findings demonstrate that apologies 
from those with high power and high status can play a key role in shaping one’s 
impressions of these individuals following an interpersonal offense, which in turn has 








Figure 1: Illustration of Willingness to Apologize depending on power or status 
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Figure 2: Illustration of perceived warmth of apologizer as a function of apology 






















Figure 3: Illustration of perceived dominance of apologizer as a function of apology 
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Figure 4: Diagram of the Mediation Model with Coefficients, Indirect Effect, and 
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Figure 5: Diagram of the Mediation Model with Coefficients, Indirect Effect, and 








Study 1: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Willingness to Apologize as a 
Function of Power and Status  
  High Status   Low Status   Control Status   Total  
Power n EMM SE   n EMM SE   n EMM SE   n EMM SE 
                
High 49 6.06a 0.21  52 5.34 b 0.21  48 5.95a 0.22  149 5.78 0.12 
Low 45 6.04 0.22  37 5.54c 0.25  57 6.26d 0.20  139 5.95 0.13 
Control 48 5.96 0.22  54      5.80 0.20  51 5.73 0.21  153 5.83 0.12 
Total 142 6.02e 0.13  143 5.56f 0.13  156 5.98e 0.12  441 5.85 0.12 
                                
Notes: EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for gender. 
a, b  Estimated marginal means with these different superscripts differ, p < .05.   
 c, d  Estimated marginal means with these different superscripts differ, p < .05.   








Study 2: Factor Loadings from Principal Axis Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation 
for a Two Factor Solution for Perception Questions (N=196) 
        
Item  Warmth Dominance 
        
Cooperative  0.889  
Agreeable  0.878  
Cordial  0.868  
Respectful  0.856  
Uncooperative   -0.744  
Quarrelsome   -0.742  
Disrespectful   -0.702  
Impolite   -0.596  
Assertive   0.804 
Dominant   0.763 
Forceful   0.646 
Self-Assured   0.621 
Submissive    -0.567 
Unassertive    -0.526 
Timid    -0.449 
Eigenvalues  7.36 2.31 
% of variance  49.1 15.4 
        












Study 2: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Warmth as a Function of 
Apology and Context  
  High Status   High Power   Total  
  n EMM SE   n EMM SE   n EMM SE 
            
Apology  50 4.35a 0.22  46 4.25c 0.23  96 4.30e 0.16 
No Apology 50 2.60b 0.22  50 2.36d 0.22  100 2.48f 0.15 
Total 100  3.47 0.15  96   3.31 0.16  196   3.39 0.16 
Notes: EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for age.  
a, b Means with these different superscripts differ, p < .05.   
 c, d Means with these different superscripts differ, p < .05.   
e, f  Means with these different superscripts differ, p < .05.   
 
Table 4 
Study 2: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Dominance as a Function of 
Apology and Context  
  High Status   High Power   Total  
  n EMM SE   n EMM SE   n EMM SE 
            
Apology  50 7.17 0.18  46 7.20 0.19  96 7.18 0.13 
No Apology 50 7.40 0.18  50 7.65 0.18  100 7.52 0.13 
Total 100 7.28 0.13  96 7.42 0.13  196 7.35 0.13 
Note: EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for age.  
 
Table 5 
Study 2: Univariate Effects of Apology and Context on Warmth and Dominance 
Variable   df MS F p Partial η^2 
       
Age Dominance 1 15.47 9.78 0.002 0.05 
 Warmth 1 4.58 1.98 0.161 0.01 
Apology Dominance 1 5.56 3.52 0.062 0.02 
 Warmth 1 162.68 70.40 0.000 0.27 
Context Dominance 1 0.89 0.56 0.454 0.00 
 Warmth 1 1.27 0.55 0.460 0.00 
Apology x Context Dominance 1 0.59 0.37 0.542 0.00 
 Warmth 1 0.26 0.11 0.737 0.00 
Error Dominance 191 1.58    
 Warmth 191 2.31    





Study 3a: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Remorse as a Function 
of Power  
         
Power n EMM SE 
    
High 49 4.13 .14 
Low 45 4.25  .15 
Control 54 3.90  .14 
Total 148 4.08 .14 
        
Note: EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for age.  
 
Table 7 
Study 3a: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Willingness to 
Apologize as a Function of Power  
 
    
Power n EMM SE 
    
High 49 6.17 .17 
Low 45 6.25 .17 
Control 54 6.20 .17 
Total 148 6.19 .17 
        
















Study 3b: Means, Standard Deviations, and n for Instrumentality Perceptions as a 
Function of Status   
         
Status n M SD 
    
High 53  3.46 a 0.77 
Low 46  2.96 b 0.72 
Control 49  3.29 a 0.67 
Total 148      3.25 0.75 
        




Study 3b: Estimated Marginal Means, Standard Errors, and n for Willingness to 
Apologize as a Function of Status  
    
    
Status n EMM SE 
    
High 53     6.28 a .15 
Low 46     5.77 b .17 
Control 49     6.28 a .16 
Total 148     6.11 .16 
        
 Notes: EMM = Estimated marginal means, adjusted for gender.  














Study 1 Materials 
High Status Condition 
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of status within this 
organization.  You have the sense that your colleagues really like, respect, and admire 
you.  Indeed, you possess a great deal of esteem within the organization.  Note that this is 
separate from the level of power that you possess in the organization.   
Low Status Condition 
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little status within this 
organization.  You have do not have the sense that your colleagues particularly like, 
respect, and admire you.  Indeed, you possess little esteem within the organization.  Note 
that this is separate from the level of power that you possess in the organization.   
High Power Condition 
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of power within this 
organization.  Indeed you are one of the most powerful individuals in the company.  You 
are personally given control over an unusually large amount of resources, compared with 
your peers in other departments.  Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or 
admiration that others in the organization feel toward you. 
Low Power Condition 
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little power within this 
organization.  Indeed you are one of the least powerful individuals in the company.  You 




your peers in other departments.  Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or 
admiration that others in the organization feel toward you.   
Control Condition  
You work at a pharmaceutical company.   
High Power/High Status Condition 
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of status within this 
organization.  You have the sense that your colleagues really like, respect, and admire 
you.  Indeed, you possess a great deal of esteem within the organization. 
In addition, you hold a great deal of power within this organization.  Indeed, you are one 
of the most powerful individuals in the company.  You are personally given control over 
an unusually large amount of resources, compared with your peers in other departments. 
Scenario 
You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing the 
product pipeline for the company.  At one point in the meeting one of your colleagues 
begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant.  You interrupt the colleague and state 
that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in front of the rest of the group. 
Post-Scenario Questions 
How much power do you have at the company?  
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "None at all" and 7 = "A great deal" 
 
How much status do you have at the company?  
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "None at all" and 7 = "A great deal" 
 
How likely are you to apologize to your colleague about what happened during the 
meeting?  
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Extremely unlikely" and 7 = "Extremely likely" 
 
The following is the definition of apology: an explicit verbal or written statement of 





Study 2 Materials 
Scenario 
You work at a pharmaceutical company, and you are in a work meeting with a group of 
colleagues.  At one point in the meeting you begin to ask a question about the product 
pipeline.  At that point one of your colleagues interrupts you and states that the question 
that you have posed is “stupid” in front of the rest of the group. 
Status Condition  
The person who interrupted you has a great deal of status in your organization and is 
generally liked, respected, and admired by everyone in the organization. 
Power Condition  
The person who interrupted you has a great deal of power in your organization and 
controls an unusually large amount of resources compared with others in the 
organization. 
Apology Condition 
The following day the person who interrupted you apologized to you for the interruption 
and for being rude. This person promised you that it would never happen again.  You 
believe that this person’s apology was sincere. 










Please indicate the extent to which each of the following terms describes the person who 
interrupted you.  Use a 9-point scale to indicate your response, with 1 = Extremely 
Inaccurate Description and 9 = Extremely Accurate Description.   
  
1. cordial       
2. respectful   
3. cooperative   
4. agreeable   
5. impolite   
6. disrespectful   
7. uncooperative   
8. quarrelsome   
9. assertive       
10. forceful   
11. self-assured   
12. dominant   
13. submissive   
14. unassertive   








Study 3a Materials 
High Power Condition 
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of power within this 
organization.  Indeed you are one of the most powerful individuals in the company.  You 
are personally given control over an unusually large amount of resources, compared with 
your peers in other departments.  Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or 
admiration that others in the organization feel toward you. 
Low Power Condition 
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little power within this 
organization.  Indeed you are one of the least powerful individuals in the company.  You 
are personally given control over a relatively meager amount of resources, compared with 
your peers in other departments.  Note that this is separate from the amount of respect or 
admiration that others in the organization feel toward you.   
Control Condition  
You work at a pharmaceutical company.   
Scenario 
You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing the 
product pipeline for the company.  At one point in the meeting one of your colleagues 
begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant.  You interrupt the colleague and state 
that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in front of the rest of the group. 
Post-Scenario Questions 
How much power do you have at the company?  




How much regret do you have about what happened during the meeting?  
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Very little" and 7 = "A great deal." 
 
How much guilt or remorse do you have about what happened during the meeting? 
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Very little" and 7 = "A great deal." 
 
How committed are you to not behaving in that way again? 
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Very little" and 7 = "A great deal." 
 
How likely are you to apologize to your colleague about what happened during the 
meeting?  
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Extremely unlikely" and 7 = "Extremely likely." 
 
The following is the definition of apology: an explicit verbal or written statement of 







Study 3b Materials 
High Status Condition 
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold a great deal of status within this 
organization.  You have the sense that your colleagues really like, respect, and admire 
you.  Indeed, you possess a great deal of esteem within the organization.  Note that this is 
separate from the level of power that you possess in the organization.   
Low Status Condition 
You work at a pharmaceutical company and hold relatively little status within this 
organization.  You have do not have the sense that your colleagues particularly like, 
respect, and admire you.  Indeed, you possess little esteem within the organization.  Note 
that this is separate from the level of power that you possess in the organization.   
Control Condition  
You work at a pharmaceutical company.   
Scenario 
You are in a work meeting with a group of colleagues in which you are discussing the 
product pipeline for the company.  At one point in the meeting one of your colleagues 
begins to ask a question that you find irrelevant.  You interrupt the colleague and state 
that the question that the colleague has asked is “stupid” in front of the rest of the group. 
Post-Scenario Questions 
How much status do you have at the company?  
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "None at all" and 7 = "A great deal." 
 
To what extent do you think an apology is important for your colleague?  






How effective do you think an apology will be to restore your relationship with your 
colleague?  
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Not at all" and 7 = "Very much so" 
 
To what extent do you think an apology will repair the damaged trust between you and 
your colleague?  
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Not at all" and 7 = "Very much so" 
 
How likely are you to apologize to your colleague about what happened during the 
meeting?  
7-point Likert scale, anchored by 1 = "Extremely unlikely" and 7 = "Extremely likely." 
 
The following is the definition of apology: an explicit verbal or written statement of 
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